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Foreword
Innovation is a hot topic in economic development circles around the world. Buoyed by the success 
of Silicon Valley, Hsinchu region, or Helsinki, innovation is seen by leading regions as the key to 
staying ahead; in those that lag, as an opportunity to catch up. The result has been a plethora of 
ambitious innovation strategies. Unfortunately, the common thread has often been under-delivery.
This failure to deliver has been blamed on many things: lack of institutions, lack of ambition, 
and lack of skilled policymakers. However, what has been less straightforward to understand is 
the extent to which such change was ever possible. In this research project, we have worked with 
leading researchers from Oxford Brookes and Cambridge Universities to use advanced economic 
techniques to uncover the extent to which ‘history matters’.
The results contain important lessons for national and regional economic policymakers. Developing 
new ‘pathways’ for economic development depends considerably on a region’s innovation system. 
However, individual policy interventions are likely to have little impact on economic development 
if they do not take into account previous economic structures and their legacy. Perhaps most 
importantly, policymakers must be patient and allow major interventions time to bear fruit.
This work feeds into a wider body of work that deals with the spatial aspects of innovation policy. 
Its insights underpin many of the practical programmes we have underway at NESTA and it forms 
the backdrop to our work with the nations, cities and regions that make up the UK. As with all of 
our work, we welcome your comments and your views.
Jonathan Kestenbaum 
CEO, NESTA
July, 2008
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NESTA is the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts.
Our aim is to transform the UK’s capacity for innovation. We invest in  
early-stage companies, inform innovation policy and encourage a culture 
that helps innovation to flourish.
Executive summary
History matters: A city-region’s past 
determines what is possible while the 
present controls what possibilities are 
explored
Local economies’ capacity to absorb new 
knowledge, grow and regenerate is developed 
over time. Industrial growth, decline and 
renewal results from historic combinations of 
knowledge assets and innovation. In turn, the 
sectoral and structural pathways followed by 
cities and regions determine their long-term 
success or failure.
The ‘lagging’ cities in our study – where 
economic development trails the national 
average (Middlesbrough, Newport, Norwich, 
Swansea and Wakefield) – are all characterised 
by weaknesses derived from their specific 
industrial histories. Conversely, ‘leading’ cities 
such as Aldershot, Cambridge, Northampton, 
Oxford, Reading and Warrington are all 
characterised by their lack of industrial 
heritage.
City-regional economies are interactive 
systems composed of four main strands
Sectoral development pathways.1.  The 
economic, social and institutional histories 
of city economies that have brought them 
to where they are in the present. Sometimes 
these can be traced back for decades if not 
centuries.
Knowledge assets.2.  These assets – which 
include universities and expenditure on 
research and development – have become 
increasingly significant as the role of 
knowledge in contemporary economic 
performance has increased.
Local innovation systems.3.  The dynamic use 
of knowledge to create new products and 
services. Here the local innovation system 
plays a critical role in combining local and 
external knowledge to inject varying degrees 
of novelty into local economic activities.
New path creation.4.  More radical 
innovations arising from the local 
innovation system sometimes generate new 
development pathways – when cities branch 
into new industrial or economic sectors. 
New ideas and new development pathways 
appear more often in cities without long 
industrial histories
We investigated five different possibilities for 
the creation of new development pathways.
Indigenous (local).1.  These included the 
actions of ‘individual stars’ such as those 
who formed Cambridge Consultants in 
1960 and the contemporary Vice Chancellor 
of Swansea University who inspired the 
Technium Programme launched in 2001. 
We expected to find that new firm creation 
played a vital role in the creation of new 
pathways. But new firm formation declined 
nationally through the 1990s and was often 
lowest in some of the more innovative 
cities. We also found that the direct role of 
local universities as institutions (as opposed 
to a few star individuals emanating from 
them) in new path creation appeared to be 
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limited. There were few university spinout 
companies in Swansea. Even in Cambridge 
the numbers of university spinouts did not 
pick up much before 2000. The main role of 
universities has been to provide a supply of 
highly qualified personnel.
Heterogeneity and diversity. 2. We 
analysed whether diversity or specialisation 
contributed most to innovation and found 
that sectoral diversity has been declining 
both nationally and in most of our sample 
of cities since at least 1981. We concluded 
from this that simple diversity is not 
necessarily a significant generator of radical 
innovations nor is it sufficient therefore 
to create new economic pathways. As a 
result, we argue that specialised diversity 
(or clustered diversity) is a more likely cause 
of radical innovations and new pathways of 
development than diversity per se.
Transplantation of a new industry 3. 
from elsewhere. Our major example is 
the electronics industry in Swansea. At 
the height of production, 50 per cent of 
televisions and 75 per cent of video cassette 
recorders (VCRs) produced in Europe were 
made in South Wales. But both these 
markets have now disappeared with cheaper 
production elsewhere and new technologies 
(decisions made by the overseas 
headquarters of the Welsh branch plants). 
While the transplantation of new industries 
from elsewhere can establish new sectoral 
pathways, our evidence suggests that 
focusing on foreign direct investment (FDI) 
can prove a risky development strategy 
without some degree of local autonomy 
and embedding in local supply chains and 
networks.
Diversification into technologically 4. 
related industries. There was some 
evidence for this in Cambridge. Starting 
from developments in information 
technology some 40 years ago, the high-
tech economy has developed in four 
successive waves.
Upgrading existing industries. 5. We were 
not able to discover significant examples of 
where existing industries were ‘upgraded’. 
Once started, new pathways tend to 
continue through a growth phase followed 
by a loss of momentum and decay unless 
their dynamism is renewed
We analysed five possible sources of path 
dependence – where firms’ development is 
strongly influenced by their historic legacy and 
contemporary circumstances:
Serendipity (chance). 1. Despite frequent 
recourse to this concept in the path 
dependence literature, we have no evidence 
from our empirical analyses of sectoral 
development being determined significantly 
by chance.
Increasing returns (the more profits 2. 
that can be made from the selling of a 
particular product or service, the more 
producers are inclined to produce of the 
same). This leads to firms and consumers 
to being locked-into repetitive patterns of 
production and consumption and hence 
limiting the opportunity for new products 
and services to make it to the market. 
These are difficult to measure for entire 
city-regional economies. We assume that 
GVA per capita is an indicator of increasing 
returns. 
Technological lock-in.3.  This is where cities 
are tied to existing technologies, and can 
either be a good or a bad thing. In Swansea, 
for example, there have been two waves 
of both growth and decline as a result 
of technological lock-in. In both cases, 
the local economy remained locked-in to 
technologies that were overtaken either by 
the discovery and exploitation of alternative 
sources of natural resources or by the 
invention of replacement technologies and 
their production elsewhere.
Institutional inertia (governmental, 4. 
organisational or cultural systems 
that lag behind economic change). 
The development of city-regional 
economies is not just the result of 
purely economic factors but also of 
simultaneous technological, socio-cultural 
and institutional developments. This was 
illustrated in our case studies of Cambridge 
and Swansea. Many of our private sector 
respondents in the two cities were critical of 
the slow pace of change in local institutions 
such as the local land-use planning system, 
and in Swansea of the grant dependency 
culture and an expectation of ‘jobs for life’.
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Strong local social networks. 5. By this 
we mean the relative strength of local 
social history and networks that form an 
important part of the norms and values 
within which local economic activities are 
conducted. These can be either a good or 
bad thing. Strong local social networks can 
encourage conformity and consequent path 
dependence. Successful innovative British* 
cities like Cambridge, Oxford, Warrington 
and Reading tend to have high levels of out-
of-region and international social networks 
and are not limited to their regional 
networks.
Knowledge assets drive the ability to 
develop new industrial pathways
The main differences between leading 
and lagging cities in our sample were their 
historically developed knowledge assets – such 
as universities and R&D infrastructure and the 
dynamism of their local innovation systems.
Among the lagging cities in our sample:
The development of knowledge-intensive •	
sectors has been slower than elsewhere.
This has had a knock-on effect on the quality •	
of human capital with lower proportions 
of both knowledge-intensive occupations 
and those specifically engaged in R&D or 
university research.
The combination of a few large private sector •	
employers with a large public sector has not 
fostered a culture of enterprise.
There exists a lack of local investment •	
and thin venture capital markets. The 
commercialisation of new ideas also appears 
limited by the low proportions of knowledge-
intensive business services in most of the 
least innovative city economies.
Leading cities have generally benefited from 
the cumulative development of their local 
absorptive capacity and innovation systems: 
They tended to have more people working in •	
knowledge-intensive occupations (KIOs).
They had more employment in R&D and •	
university research than other cities.
This was then reflected in higher rates of the •	
generation of new knowledge in the form of 
patent applications.
They were better able to commercialise these •	
new ideas as a result of higher levels of 
knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) 
in those cities.
Implications for policy
It is necessary to think large-scale and 
long-term using an evolutionary economics 
approach to understanding change and 
innovation
This should be reflected in setting realistic 
expectations, in policy analysis and in the 
evaluation of specific initiatives. 
In leading areas like Cambridge there was 
widespread scepticism among the private 
sector firms about the relevance or efficacy 
of public policy on innovation 
Few firms could name any policy that had made 
a positive and measurable difference to their 
innovation activities. Their development was 
largely based on the identification of market 
opportunities and organising to meet those 
demands. They were more concerned however 
with policies related to issues falling under 
Local Authorities jurisdiction, such as planning.
While public policies targeted specifically at 
local innovation had little apparent impact, 
several firms noted significant effects 
arising from the consequences of other 
kinds of policy
We recorded some criticism of local land use 
planning as being too slow, bureaucratic and 
unimaginative in developing transport and 
communications infrastructure. It was also held 
to place too many restrictions on the physical 
development of the new knowledge-based 
economy. 
On the other hand, the large-scale town 
expansion schemes in both Northampton 
and Warrington proved to be very successful 
at generating innovation and creating new 
industrial pathways. While the promotion 
of innovation in itself was not one of their 
original objectives, much of what they have 
achieved has been based on the creation of 
an innovative set of institutional and cultural 
phenomena that positively encourage new 
economic growth and innovation (even if by 
accident).
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* The data in this report refer mainly to Great Britain, but references to the United Kingdom are made where appropriate.
Large-scale and multi-purpose initiatives 
combined with policies that tolerate certain 
levels of redundancy have higher chances of 
success
Northampton and Warrington’s successful town 
expansion plans were based on a broad set 
of objectives none of which were specifically 
targeted on innovation. The universities of 
Cambridge and Oxford are also large scale 
institutions with multiple objectives out 
of which innovations sometimes emerge. 
Successful policy needs to be able to tolerate 
such redundancy, and the seemingly indirect 
link between interventions and eventual 
outcomes.
In lagging cities like Swansea, firms 
recognised the significance of the large-
scale EU cohesion funds
Few of the firms we interviewed in Swansea 
would have existed at all without the European 
Union structural funds obtained due to the 
area’s Objective 1 and transition fund status. 
Some are likely to die when the transition funds 
run out in 2013.
Strong local social networks and ties can be 
a barrier to developing new relationships 
with outside players that are important in 
innovation
In Swansea, the strong local social networks 
embedded in generations of working in large 
industries with expectations of jobs for life 
effectively limited the search for new ideas 
from outside Wales. Government support for 
international visits, building links with new 
markets and establishing distributors appeared 
to be more effective than its efforts to 
encourage local Welsh business networks. 
The need for international knowledge 
networks is paramount
Innovation is increasingly based on 
internationally distributed systems. Some of 
the firms in Cambridge said that their global 
networks were more important to them than 
any local ones. In geographical terms this 
world of innovation is both spiky (in that 
it has a small number of significant hubs) 
and connected. British cities that aspire to 
join this world class innovation club must 
be internationally connected and develop 
specialised niches.
Encouraging and enabling innovation is a 
long-term goal
In all our most innovative sample cities, the 
development of their current successes took 
around 30 to 40 years. Public policies that had 
played a role in the early years were not been 
based on forecasts of what emerged several 
decades later. Public policies for innovation 
should therefore be broadly enabling, allowing 
for policies to adapt and change over the long-
term. They should provide opportunities for 
radical and systemic innovations to evolve and 
emerge in ways that cannot be foreseen today.
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Part 1: Introduction
1.1 History matters
A number of authors have shown that 
capitalist economies evolve through long 
cycles of recession, recovery, growth and 
decline (Kondratieff 1935; Schumpeter 1939; 
Mensch 1979), and that these cycles develop 
differently in different places (Marshall 
1987; Hall and Preston 1988). Such insights 
led attention initially to focus on whole 
regions such as Silicon Valley in California, 
Baden-Württemberg in Germany and Emilia-
Romagna in Italy. It later became apparent 
that functional city-regions were the main 
geographic concentrations of economic 
activities. This placed them in the front line 
of globalisation where they had to remain 
competitive to survive and thrive.
As they became increasingly exposed to 
international competition, some cities adapted 
much better than others. Thus while some 
persisted with their traditional industries until 
they were overtaken by foreign competition 
or technological change, others seemed better 
able to re-invent their old industrial activities 
or create new ones. We are mainly concerned 
with the reasons underlying such long-term 
divergence in the fortunes of British cities.
We argue that an evolutionary economics 
approach is key to understanding such 
long-term economic change. There are four 
strands within a local interactive system 
which, for the purposes of clarity, we examine 
sequentially. The first strand includes the 
sectoral development pathways – the key 
industries – that developed in different cities 
over decades and centuries. They represent 
the economic, social and institutional histories 
of city economies that have brought them 
to where they are today. They determine 
what is immediately possible in a given city’s 
economy. This is partly because they determine 
much of the second strand of analysis which 
includes the knowledge assets or absorptive 
capacity of the local economy. These assets – 
including higher education and R&D – have 
become increasingly significant as the role 
of knowledge in contemporary economic 
performance has increased. The third strand 
of analysis is concerned with the dynamic use 
of knowledge to create new products and 
services. Here the local innovation system plays 
a critical role in combining local and external 
knowledge to inject varying degrees of novelty 
into local economic activities. This system plays 
a key role in selecting from the historically 
determined range of possible pathways those 
that develop in the future. The more radical 
innovations arising from this system sometimes 
generate new development pathways, where 
new types of industry or economic sector are 
involved. This new path creation is the fourth 
strand of our analysis.
The interactions between such pathways, their 
knowledge assets and their local innovation 
system determine the long-term success 
or failure of their economic sectors. They 
therefore decide the nature of the sectoral 
and structural pathways followed in particular 
city-regional economies. In our study, cities 
like Leeds, Middlesbrough, Newport, Norwich, 
Swansea and Wakefield have experienced 
decline in many of their industries inherited 
from the Industrial Revolution. By contrast 
Aldershot, Cambridge, Oxford, Northampton, 
Reading and Warrington, relatively 
unencumbered by their industrial heritages by 
the early 1980s, have prospered.
We adopt an evolutionary economics approach 
to understand such long-term developments 
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Figure 1: Relative growth trajectories of the English core city-regions, 1980-2005 (UK=100)
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and the dynamics of distinctive local innovation 
systems along with their differing abilities 
to absorb and use new knowledge within 
particular city-regions. 
The importance of taking a long-term (historic 
or dynamic) view of the development pathways 
is illustrated by Figure 1. This shows the 
relative growth in GDP per capita for the 
English core city-regions from 1980 to 2005. 
The picture is one of increasing divergence in 
relative and absolute prosperity, with London 
and the Bristol city-region pulling ahead of 
the rest of the group. There are also few major 
shifts in relative position, suggesting that the 
pattern of growth across these city-regions 
tends to reproduce itself over time. 
 We argue that a key underlying reason for such 
differential economic growth is the aggregate 
ability of the different city-region economies to 
generate or adopt new economically valuable 
knowledge. This requires continual indigenous 
innovation combined with the ability to absorb 
and adopt new knowledge from elsewhere. 
 There are three main evolutionary approaches 
to analysing economic change and innovation. 
These are: the Darwinian-inspired biological 
analogy and the notion of the co-evolution of 
institutions with economic change; complex 
adaptive systems theory; and path dependence 
theory. These are illustrated schematically in 
Figure 2.
Within these three theoretical approaches, 
evolutionary economists have addressed 
issues where mainstream economics offers 
little theoretical explanation. Their big 
themes include economic growth and decline, 
technological change, industry life cycle 
studies and the importance of institutions in 
influencing economic change (Essletzbichler 
and Rigby 2006). Research in these areas 
includes economic growth (Nelson and 
Winter 1982, Nelson 1995, Verspagen 2001), 
technological change (Arthur 1987, 1988, 
David 1985, Dosi 1982, Dosi et al. 1988, Pavitt 
1984, 1999), industrial evolution (Abernathy 
and Utterback 1978, Klepper and Graddy 
1990, Klepper 2001), and the importance 
of institutions and regimes (Hodgson 1988, 
Nelson 2001, Veblen 2001). This body of work 
is now substantial enough for Witt (2003) to 
have produced a collection of classic articles 
in evolutionary theory, for Hodgson (1993) 
12
to have provided a history of evolutionary 
theorising, and for a new evolutionary 
microeconomics to have emerged (Potts, 
2000).
In this study of the innovative development of 
British cities, we draw on all three perspectives, 
but especially on the path dependence 
approach, in order to address directly the 
following questions:
Why has the economic performance of British •	
regions and cities been diverging over the 
long-term?
What are the relationships between this •	
divergence and differences in the ability 
to generate new economically valuable 
knowledge?
1.2 Thinking about the development of 
cities: path dependent evolution
From an evolutionary perspective, these 
empirical observations lead us to ask, given 
similar evolutionary principles in different 
economies: how does their historical 
development lead them to such divergent 
outcomes? The answer for many evolutionary 
economists is that once a particular pattern of 
socio-economic development is established, 
it can become cumulative and entrenched 
or ‘path dependent’ (Martin 2003, p. 27). 
Martin and Sunley (2006, p. 402) define path 
dependence as “a probabilistic and contingent 
process (in which) at each moment in historical 
time the suite of possible future evolutionary 
trajectories (paths) of a technology, institution, 
firm or industry is conditioned by (is contingent 
on) both the past and the current states of 
the system in question”. Put another way, 
economies inherit the legacy of their past 
development, and this partly shapes the 
possibilities for the future.
A four-phase model of the path dependent 
evolution of an industrial sector in an urban or 
regional economy can be hypothesised: a pre-
formation stage; a path creation phase, a path 
lock-in phase, and a path dissolution phase 
(see Figure 3). 
New industrial paths do not emerge in a 
vacuum, but always in the context of existing 
structures and paths of technology, and 
institutional arrangements. These existing 
structures and paths together constitute the 
‘pre-formation phase’. At this phase, several 
different alternative new technologies or 
industries may co-exist. Which particular 
technology, product or industry emerges – 
or is ‘selected’ – may simply be a chance or 
contingent event, for example where conditions 
happen to favour one alternative over another, 
or where it has a slight ‘first-mover’ advantage; 
but it could also be the result of deliberate 
and purposive (and competitive) behaviour by 
Figure 2: Three perspectives on economic evolution 
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economic agents or institutions (such as a local 
university research laboratory).
This development then begins to attract 
other actors or acquires market influence; a 
critical mass around this activity begins to 
build up and a development path is formed 
(Path-Creation Phase). Once this critical 
mass achieves a certain size or momentum, 
the path gets ‘locked-in’, and a third phase 
of cumulative and self-reinforcing (catalytic) 
development along this path ensues (Path 
Dependent). 
Loss of momentum and development can result 
for several reasons. It can arise because of the 
emergence of external competition, radical 
innovation or new technology elsewhere. It 
can arise because of the onset of an internal 
slowdown in the innovative dynamism of the 
sector concerned. Loss of momentum can 
also be the direct result of the movement of 
key firms and actors to other locations. As a 
consequence, the path will break down and 
dissolve. 
On the other hand, if firms adapt and adjust to 
such processes by engaging in a renewed phase 
of intensive innovation and development, 
the path may then not dissolve but be given 
a further phase of growth. So while many 
industrial technological paths do follow a ‘rise, 
lock-in, and decline’ life cycle, others seem 
able to ‘reinvent’ themselves successfully. 
These two contrasting possibilities are shown 
schematically in Figure 4. Of course, both types 
of path can co-exist in an urban economy. 
Some research shows that where strong local 
networks exist the interactions and learning 
between partners can constrain possible future 
paths of development; hence the process 
becomes path dependent (Lambooy 2004, p. 
648). There is also some evidence that strong 
local networks can induce a ‘lemming effect’ 
– where participants simply follow the lead of 
others – as in the Ruhr (Grabher 1993) and 
Swiss mechanical watch making (Maillat 1996; 
Glasmeier 2000). The lesson here is that local 
networks need to be open to their national and 
the international economy in order to prevent 
them from becoming too parochial and inbred 
in their search for commercially valuable new 
knowledge.
While the evolution of many economic entities 
through history is path dependent, new 
pathways do also start from time to time. Thus 
we need both a theory of path dependence 
and one of path creation. While we do not 
as yet have a fully articulated and generally 
accepted theory of path dependence and how 
it is created (Martin and Sunley 2006, p. 408), 
our argument above suggests that we should 
be investigating the roles of human decision-
making in conditions of uncertainty and the 
structure and extent of knowledge networks in 
seeking such an explanation.
Figure 3: Path dependence and the development of a new technological/industrial sector 
in the urban economy
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For now, however, the lack of a generally 
accepted theory of path dependence means 
that there are different conceptualisations of 
the term and also of the possible causes of the 
establishment of new pathways. Martin (2003, 
p. 29) has identified at least five different 
sources of path dependence. These are:
Dependence on initial external chance 1. 
events.
Technological lock-in (Paul David).2. 
Increasing returns (Brian Arthur).3. 
Institutional hysteresis (Douglas North, 4. 
Mark Setterfield).
Social embeddedness.5. 
 A critical issue in explanations of path 
dependence is why and how new pathways 
get started. In much of the path dependency 
literature the emergence of novelty and new 
pathways is said to be accidental. Although 
new developments such as the discovery of 
penicillin or the inspiration for Silicon Valley 
were partly chance events, reliance on random 
chance is not generally a good enough 
explanation for the creation of new pathways. 
It offers little explanation, since after the initial 
chance the rest is merely descriptive history. 
Martin and Sunley (2006) suggest five possible 
reasons for the start of new pathways in 
particular (urban and regional) economies. 
These are:
Indigenous creation.1. 
Heterogeneity and diversity.2. 
Diversification into technologically related 3. 
industries.
Upgrading of existing industries.4. 
Transplantation from elsewhere (Martin and 5. 
Sunley 2006, p. 420).
The first four of these meet the criteria of 
evolutionary systems while, strictly speaking, 
the transplantation of innovation and novelty 
from elsewhere does not.
Most work, particularly by economic 
geographers has focused on the first of these 
path creation mechanisms – indigenous 
creation. Here the organisation of the 
production and transfer of new knowledge is 
the key element in the establishment of new 
Figure 4: Two alternative path dependence trajectories
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pathways. Patel and Pavitt (1997) argue that 
the main innovation actors – firms – develop 
most of their new technologies in-house by 
modifying processes alongside contributions 
from other firms and the science base. Most 
of the time firms build and improve upon their 
existing technological base. Patel and Pavitt 
call this technological accumulation. 
Branching out of existing industries into new 
but technologically related activities can 
also create new pathways. Some firms, for 
example 3M, are well known for pursuing such 
a strategy. Over the years it has developed its 
basic adhesive technology from producing sand 
paper and Post-It™ notes to plasma screens. 
The British motor sport industry has also 
developed close to areas with generic skills in 
the mass production car industries, particularly 
Birmingham, Coventry and Oxford (Pinch and 
Henry, 1999). 
New pathways can also be created by 
upgrading existing industries. In this scenario, 
existing industries are revitalised and enhanced 
by the infusion of new technologies or the 
introduction of new products and services. 
This evolution is not easy. Some of the few 
remaining furniture manufacturers in High 
Wycombe have achieved such change by 
adding the organisation of the furnishing of 
entire office blocks to their manufacturing 
activities. Generally, however, firms can do only 
a few things well at any one time; their learning 
capabilities are equally constrained (Nelson 
1995, p. 79). 
1.3 The application of long-term 
historic analysis to understanding the 
development of city-regional economies
The analysis of the long-term development of 
city-region economies requires an analysis of 
three interrelated phenomena. These are the 
structural evolution of the economy, including 
the decline or maintenance of old sectors 
and the creation of new ones; the capacity to 
identify, assimilate and exploit new knowledge; 
and the indigenous creation, adoption and 
commercialisation of new knowledge. Each of 
these phenomena has its own conceptual and 
measurement problems. The overall structure of 
the analysis is illustrated in Figure 5.
Economic development
Unless development takes place in previously 
underdeveloped localities, such as North West 
England before the Industrial Revolution or 
Santa Clara County before the ICT revolution, 
then their economic pathways are highly 
dependent on their previous economic 
histories. The structural characteristics of 
previous eras determine many of the possible 
directions of future development, making many 
local economic changes path dependent.
Figure 5: Path dependence, local innovation systems and absorptive capacity
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In the long-run, city-regional economies do not 
follow the same paths forever. Those that do 
not create new pathways tend to stagnate and 
eventually decline. The creation of new paths 
of technological and industrial development is 
critical to the continued survival and growth of 
urban economies. Much of this, along with the 
continual change and adaptation in existing 
pathways, is dependent on new knowledge and 
its commercial success in national and world 
markets. Thus innovation drives both path 
development and new path creation.
Absorptive capacity
Underlying the ability to create new knowledge 
in the form of innovation is the need to 
be able to recognise, understand and use 
relevant knowledge. These attributes have 
come to be known collectively as absorptive 
capacity. This concept as applied to individual 
firms was introduced by Cohen and Levinthal 
(1989). They define it as the “ability to 
utilize externally held knowledge through 
three sequential processes: (1) recognizing 
and understanding potentially valuable 
new knowledge outside the firm through 
exploratory learning, (2) assimilating valuable 
new knowledge through transformative 
learning, and (3) using and assimilating 
knowledge to create new knowledge and 
commercial outputs through exploitative 
learning”. An outcome of absorptive capacity is 
innovation.
Firms that develop strong in-house knowledge 
bases have greater absorptive capacity 
and more incentives to search for external 
knowledge, as they know that they will be able 
to use it profitably. Such firms are also likely to 
be sought out by similar firms with strong in-
house knowledge bases. All other things being 
equal, this means that such firms are probably 
better at developing groundbreaking ideas and 
of collectively using them to develop pathways 
of economic development.
According to Lane et al. (2006), absorptive 
capacity: 
builds on prior investments in absorptive 1. 
capacities;
tends to develop cumulatively and is 2. 
therefore itself path dependent; and
depends on the organisation’s ability to share 3. 
knowledge and communicate internally.
Innovation
Joseph Schumpeter, the founding father of 
evolutionary analyses of innovation, defined 
the activity as the “carrying out of new 
combinations such as a new good, a new 
method of production, a new market, a new 
source of supply, a new industrial organisation” 
(Schumpeter 1961). These constituted what 
he called the process of “creative destruction” 
(Schumpeter 1942). Although his analysis 
has inspired much of the subsequent work on 
technological innovation, Schumpeter himself 
was at pains to point out that innovation did 
not need to be technological. So, for example, 
he regarded the setting up of new production 
functions, new forms of organisation and the 
opening up of new markets as innovations. 
Despite his insight, much subsequent work has 
focused on the contribution of technological 
product and process innovation to economic 
change. This is partly because it is a key 
economic driver and partly because it has 
proved easier to measure than other forms of 
innovation that also play important parts.
Much of Schumpeter’s analysis is echoed in the 
more recent definition of innovation contained 
in The Oslo Manual Guidelines for Collecting 
and Interpreting Innovation Data, where 
innovation is defined as “the implementation 
of a new or significantly improved product 
(good or service), or process, a new marketing 
method, or a new organisational method in 
business practices, workplace organisation or 
external relations” (OECD 2005, p. 46).
Innovation in the form of the creation, 
adoption, and commercialisation of new 
economically valuable knowledge within urban 
economies is based on complex relationships 
between the nature and types of economic 
variety present in those economies and the 
capacity of the local innovation systems to 
combine this endogenous knowledge with that 
drawn from other sources and locations across 
the international economy.
The degree of economic variety – the range of 
economic sectors in a city – represents another 
important indicator of the changing stock of 
knowledge in an urban economy over time. The 
pathways and sectoral change that emerge in 
city-regional economies determine the level 
and extent of economic variety present in those 
economies at any given moment. This variety 
determines the knowledge available for later 
innovations. With city economies as a whole, 
we are primarily concerned with aggregate 
variety as expressed in agglomeration 
economies – economies of scale and 
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networking opportunities – that are external 
to individual firms in any individual local 
innovation system. The varieties of knowledge 
combined with the aggregate ability to acquire, 
transform and exploit that knowledge are the 
basis of its local innovation system. The nature 
of local, territorial innovation systems has been 
laid out by, among others, Marshall (1932), 
Camagni (1991), Storper and Scott (1992), 
Lundvall (1992) Braczyk et al. (1998), de la 
Mothe and Paquet (1998), Florida (1998) and 
Simmie (2001). They form a crucial part of the 
open architecture of city economies. 
The main function of local innovation systems 
is to generate new (practical) knowledge and 
to commercialise it. The generation of novelty 
by recombining indigenous knowledge with 
external new knowledge provides a local 
economy with its evolutionary momentum. The 
interaction between this momentum and the 
external environment determines the extent 
to which the economy is subject to positive 
or negative lock-in and the rate of new path 
creation. In lagging city economies existing 
varieties of knowledge tend to decay with 
time, and the economy becomes locked-in to 
increasingly outdated activities. In leading cities 
where a local innovation system is constantly 
creating and importing new knowledge, the 
economy can either be positively locked-in to 
leading edge sectors or creating new ones.
A supposed advantage of all forms of 
agglomeration economies is the link between 
geographical proximity and knowledge 
spillover. Geographical proximity should 
facilitate intense sharing of ideas. At the 
same time the concentration of knowledge 
within cities also makes them hubs in the 
wider national and international distribution 
of knowledge (Simmie, 2003). Their internal 
and external connections also contribute to the 
relative intensity of knowledge transfers.
Networking is crucial to the creation and 
adoption of new forms of knowledge. Potts 
(2000) argues that knowledge is a structure 
of connections, and the various instances of 
knowledge – such as technology, routines, 
habits, competences and the like – are 
instances of specific connections. From this 
perspective innovation-based economic 
evolution is about the emergence and evolution 
of multiple connections, most significantly in 
the form of knowledge networks. Much work 
in this area has not distinguished between 
different kinds of networks.
But there are at least two kinds of networks 
fulfilling significantly different functions. 
Business networks facilitate the co-ordination 
of decisions made by individuals, departments, 
firms or cities. Knowledge networks enable 
the transmission of data, information, and 
knowledge by using or making connections 
with various degrees of intensity (Lambooy 
2004, p. 643). Giuliana (2006, p. 5) defines 
the latter as “the network that links firms 
through the transfer of knowledge for the 
solution of complex technical problems”. 
They are especially significant for the transfer, 
exchange and diffusion of tacit informal 
knowledge, because of their ability to build 
trust and understanding. These are referred to 
as ‘relational capital’.
This has spatial implications. Thus, for example, 
it is to be expected that different places will 
have different strengths and this will affect 
the extent to which they are connected to 
each other. Geographical proximity is not 
a necessary condition for tacit knowledge 
transfer. Dense social networks rather than 
particular regions may be effective vehicles for 
the creation and diffusion of knowledge (Rallet 
and Torre 1999, Breschi and Lissoni 2002, 
Boschma 2006, p.16). Indeed it is becoming 
clear that knowledge creation and innovation 
is an internationally distributed activity with 
different elements located in different places, 
with local, regional, national and international 
connections (DTI/ONS, 2005). 
The geography of this international system 
is spiky and connected. It is spiky in the 
sense that the highest rates of innovation are 
concentrated in a few city-regions around the 
globe including:
USA – Silicon Valley, Seattle, Austin, Raleigh, •	
Boston.
Europe – Stockholm, Munich, Helsinki, and •	
also Israel.
India – Bangalore.•	
Far East – Beijing, Singapore, Seoul, •	
Shanghai, Taiwan, Tokyo (Miles and Daniels 
2007, p.15).
It is connected in the sense that these cities 
are also major hubs in international knowledge 
networks. Local innovation systems link to 
such cities so that, as far as possible, local 
businesses know the latest thinking and the 
local system has the capacity to absorb and 
combine both internal and external knowledge 
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into new practical and commercial forms of 
novelty. 
1.4 Outline of the study
In order to investigate these arguments 
empirically we used a sample frame of all 
63 city-regions in Great Britain with core 
populations of 125,000 or more. These are 
shown in Map 1. We analysed their recent 
innovative performance on the basis of the 
results of the Fourth Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS4) covering the period 2002-2004. 
We contrasted cities based on this data and 
selected a sample of six of the most innovative 
and six of the least innovative cities in Great 
Britain for detailed analysis. We then collected 
long-term secondary data for these 12 cities 
to illustrate the relationships between their 
sectoral development pathways and the 
absorptive capacities and innovation underlying 
and driving them. We selected two of the most 
contrasting cities, Cambridge and Swansea, for 
more detailed historical analysis.
Our task is to explain the long-run divergence 
of city-regional economies in Britain. Our 
approach is to adopt an analysis based on 
the theoretical concepts of evolutionary path 
dependence. We argue that this is appropriate 
because it focuses on the dynamics underlying 
the long-run structural changes in spatial 
economies. 
We argue that local innovation systems are 
the key driving mechanism underlying change 
in spatial economies because they are the 
primary source of new commercially valuable 
knowledge. Indeed, their main functions are 
the creation, adoption and commercialisation 
of such knowledge. It has also become, along 
with land, capital and labour, a key factor of 
modern economic production.
Underlying the ability to innovate is the 
collective absorptive capacity of the firms, 
institutions and organisations located in a 
particular city. This provides the asset base for 
the identification, assimilation and exploitation 
of new knowledge. This capacity is itself 
path dependent on the distinctive structures 
and pathways that emerge in specific urban 
economies.
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Map 1: Travel-to-Work Areas with core populations > 125,000 in 2001
Source: Travel-to-Work Areas 1998. National Statistics.
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Part 2: Path dependence and innovation across 12 British 
cities
2.1 The bases of path dependence and 
new path creation 
Our basic argument is that the sectoral 
pathways that develop over time within city-
regional economies collectively determine the 
relative capacities of those spatial economies 
to absorb new knowledge from their external 
environments because they determine to a 
large extent:
the occupations that emerge in different •	
sectors; 
the types of knowledge assets and •	
infrastructures that emerge as a result of 
both private and collective investments in 
accessing and exploiting new knowledge; 
and 
the individual and collective capacities to •	
interact with external sources of knowledge 
and to exploit them in combination with local 
knowledge assets.
These interactive relationships are illustrated in 
Figure 6.
Path dependent
development 
Chance events
Increasing returns
Technological lock-in
Institutional hysteresis
Social embeddedness 
New path
creation
Indigenous creation
Heterogeneity and diversity
Transplantation from elsewhere
Diversification into related industries 
Upgrading existing industries
Absorptive  
capacity
Knowledge:
Identification
Assimilation
Exploitation
Local innovation
system 
Knowledge:
Creation
Adoption
Commercialisation
Figure 6: Path dependent development, absorptive capacity and local innovation systems
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Not all the potential sources of path dependent 
development or new path creation can be 
investigated using existing secondary sources 
of data. As a result, in this chapter we focus 
on the limited set of data sources that are 
available on a reasonably consistent geographic 
and definitional basis from the early 1980s. We 
would have preferred to have been able to use 
longer time series but in most cases these are 
just not available in a consistent or electronic 
form.
A further difficulty in tracking and interpreting 
long-run urban economic change is that many 
other factors are also changing at the same 
time. There are therefore issues to be dealt 
with surrounding the interpretation of what is 
significant in the urban context. One such issue 
is that cities are where changes in the national 
economy are played out. Thus there are 
complex interactions between what happens 
in individual cities and what happens in the 
national economy as a whole. In the analysis of 
the long-run development of city economies, 
it is also important to expose the underlying 
trends rather than focusing on the annual ups 
and downs of economic change. One way of 
dealing with these problems is to examine the 
smoothed changes taking place between the 
main trough years of the national economic 
cycle. For the practical time frame of this study 
these years were 1980, 1991 and 2005. Figure 
8 shows the smoothed growth trends between 
these key years.
Following Figure 7 we should expect that, if 
city economies both compose and reflect the 
national economy, the ‘normal’ trajectory of 
their economic development between 1980 
and 2005 would have followed an upward 
trend. Cities and sectors that did not grow 
relative to this overall trend could therefore 
be considered to have experienced relative 
decline while those that grew faster than this 
trend could be considered to have experienced 
relative growth. 
In this chapter, we select 12 contrasting cities 
from among all those 63 in Great Britain with 
core populations greater than 125,000. We 
use their respective Travel-to-Work Areas 
(TTWAs) as our main unit of spatial analysis. 
In subsequent sections we use what secondary 
time series data are available to analyse: 
their development pathways;•	
their collective absorptive capacities; •	
their local innovation systems; and•	
the creation of new pathways.•	
1980 20051991
Trough years
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0
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-0.5
-1.5
-2
-2.5
2
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1
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growth
Figure 7: Smoothed trough to trough growth in UK GDP 1980-2005 (at constant 2003 prices)
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Map 2: Introduction of novel products in GB cities CIS4, 2002-2004
Source: Travel-to-Work Areas 1998. National Statistics.
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2.2 Selection of leading and lagging 
city-regions
In order to select particular cities to illustrate 
the nature of path dependent development 
and the respective roles of their collective 
absorptive capacities and local innovation 
systems in their development, we first analysed 
the innovation outcomes shown in the results 
of CIS4 for all 63 British cities with core 
populations greater than 125,000. Figure 
10 shows the introduction of novel products 
between 2002 and 2004 and the wide variation 
in innovation outcomes between British 
cities. The highest rates of such innovation 
were located mainly in Southern England 
particularly around the Greater South East 
(GSE). The lowest rates were disproportionately 
concentrated in cities located around peripheral 
coastal areas in England and Wales and also in 
middle and Northern England. 
In order to illustrate the historical trajectories 
that have led to such results we selected a 
sample of 12 cities for further more detailed 
analyses using existing data sets (mainly 
time series). Six were selected from the top 
deciles of performers on the six different 
measures of innovation outcome provided 
by CIS4. A further six were selected from the 
corresponding bottom deciles. Table 1 shows 
the results of this selection exercise.
2.3 Path dependent development in old 
and new industrial areas is diverging
From our selection of cities, we can see the 
long-term nature of the pathways followed 
to arrive at their positions in the early 21st 
century. Thus, all the cities in the lowest 
deciles except Norwich had experienced rapid 
Table 1: Best and worst performing cities on CIS4 innovation measures
Source: Analysis of CIS4 dataset at city level, for GB cities with a population above 125,000 and a sample size of at least 75 
firms in CIS4. Cities highlighted in bold are those included in the final selection of 12 cities.
Innovation measure
 
Percentage of firms introducing 
novel products
 
 
Percentage of firms introducing 
novel processes
 
 
Percentage of firms introducing 
new or improved products
 
 
Percentage of firms introducing 
new or improved processes
 
 
Percentage of firms 
implementing major changes to 
organisational structure
 
Percentage of firms 
implementing changes 
in marketing concepts or 
strategies
Cities in top decile 
(best first)
Cambridge (35 per cent) 
Aldershot (27 per cent) 
Northampton (25 per cent) 
Portsmouth (23 per cent)
Northampton (11 per cent) 
Wakefield (11 per cent) 
Cambridge (10 per cent) 
Bournemouth (9 per cent)
Cambridge (45 per cent) 
Northampton (42 per cent) 
Aldershot (38 per cent) 
Milton Keynes (38 per cent)
Oxford (32 per cent) 
Northampton (29 per cent) 
Southampton (27 per cent) 
Bournemouth (26 per cent)
Reading (34 per cent) 
Milton Keynes (31 per cent) 
Portsmouth (31 per cent) 
Oxford (31 per cent)
Warrington (32 per cent) 
Reading (31 per cent) 
Birkenhead (31 per cent) 
Crawley (31 per cent)
Cities in bottom decile 
(worst first)
Swansea (6 per cent) 
Leeds (10 per cent) 
Birkenhead (11 per cent) 
Cardiff (11 per cent)
Newport (2 per cent) 
Southend (3 per cent) 
Mansfield (3 per cent) 
Leeds (3 per cent)
Swansea (18 per cent) 
Norwich (20 per cent) 
Southend (22 per cent) 
Cardiff (24 per cent)
Leeds (13 per cent) 
Norwich (15 per cent) 
Stoke (16 per cent) 
Swansea (16 per cent)
Wakefield (13 per cent) 
Preston (16 per cent) 
Newport (16 per cent) 
Southend (17 per cent)
Wakefield (13 per cent) 
Middlesbrough (15 per cent) 
Swansea (16 per cent) 
Norwich (16 per cent)
growth in the 19th century. This was primarily 
driven by industries such as copper and coal 
mining and the manufacture of steel, ships 
and textiles. By the start of the 20th century 
they were still leading centres for the export of 
these goods into world markets. This industrial 
heritage continued more or less successfully 
into the 1950s.
In contrast those in the highest deciles had 
remained largely unaffected by the Industrial 
Revolution and were primarily university cities, 
small manufacturing towns or rural centres 
in 1900. This only began to change between 
the two World Wars with, for example, the 
introduction of the motor car industry in 
Oxford. 
Change occurred during the late 1950s 
and 1960s as improvements in transport 
and communication facilitated the growing 
internationalisation of the world economy. Now 
the products of the Industrial Revolution that 
had sustained the local economies of Leeds, 
Middlesbrough, Newport and Swansea could 
be supplied more competitively by the newly 
developing and industrialising economies of 
Asia and South America. This also marked the 
beginning of the declining competitiveness of 
many of the UK’s manufacturing industries.
During this period our sample cities that were 
not tied to previous industrial pathways were 
developing more modern sectors such as 
electronics, motor cars, computers and software 
together with financial services. Others like 
Northampton and Warrington were designated 
as the locations for major town expansion or 
new town status. This also provided possibilities 
for new economic pathways to be created 
in those localities untrammelled by past and 
declining industrial sectors.
So by 1981 many of their relative fortunes 
had been or were soon to be reversed from 
what they had been even as late as the 1950s. 
Figure 9 shows the relative changes taking 
place in GVA per capita between 1981 and 
2005 using 1981 as index 100. During this 
period Middlesbrough, a once successful 
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Figure 8: Selected cities best fit NUTS 3 area GVA per capita 1981-2005
city, started above the British average but 
declined below it, while Newport, Swansea and 
Wakefield all fell below the British average over 
the entire period. Although Norwich was not 
much affected by the Industrial Revolution, it 
continued a long-term relative decline from 
being the third city in England during the 
agricultural era to have the lowest GVA per 
capita of any of our cities by 2005.
By contrast, Leeds appears to have been our 
most successful city at shaking off its old 
industrial heritage and creating new pathways 
in financial services. Along with Oxford it was 
our only city consistently to out-perform the 
British average over the 24-year period. The 
remaining top decile cities all started below the 
average in 1981 but had overtaken it – quite 
spectacularly in Reading – by 2005. Aldershot, 
Cambridge, Northampton and Warrington also 
all accelerated past the average GVA per capita 
during the period. As a result, the relative 
prosperity of our cities aside from Leeds 
and Norwich has been reversed over the last 
quarter of a century.
Not surprisingly these findings also show 
that there was some net divergence in 
overall economic performance between 
those economies that accelerated faster than 
the British average and those that declined 
below it. Two extreme cases of divergence are 
illustrated by Reading and Middlesbrough. 
While the latter’s GVA per capita was above 
average in 1981 and the former’s was below, 
by 2005 the reverse was the case. Reading 
was among the leading performers and 
Middlesbrough among the laggards.
2.4 Absorptive capacity in the form of 
knowledge assets is one of the bases 
of divergence between city-regional 
economies
Absorptive capacity may be defined as “a 
firm’s ability to identify, assimilate and exploit 
knowledge from external sources” (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990). In city economies, the concept 
refers to the ‘collective capacity’ of the firms, 
organisations or institutions in the locality 
to absorb knowledge from external sources. 
These sources may be found either within the 
same city-regional economy or anywhere else 
in the national or the international economy. 
The key limiting factor in any particular city’s 
ability to absorb new knowledge is the current 
collective capacity in the locality. Much of this 
reflects the cumulative historical development 
trajectories of local firms, research centres 
and universities. Between them they will have 
determined the types of occupations available 
and therefore the quality and kinds of expertise 
and knowledge developed in the locality. 
We analyse first the internal knowledge assets 
of our sample of cities. These include their 
knowledge-intensive occupational structures 
and the amounts of human capital devoted to 
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Figure 9: Knowledge-intensive occupations 2001
R&D and higher education. We then examine 
how effective the urban economies are at 
identifying and assimilating knowledge from 
sources external to the city itself.
Figure 10 shows the concentrations of 
graduates by occupation as identified in 
the 2001 Census. It may be seen that those 
with the highest proportions of graduates 
are professional, associate professional and 
technical, and managers and senior officials. 
We therefore define these, for the purposes of 
this study, as knowledge-intensive occupations 
(KIOs).
Figure 11 shows the changes taking place in 
the proportions of workplace-based employees 
in KIOs for our selected cities reflecting the 
sectoral development pathways followed in 
those city-regions between 1981 and 2005 
relative to the British average. So we can see 
that Reading, Aldershot, Cambridge and Oxford 
all started and continued with higher than 
average proportions of KIO employees. The 
growth of KIOs in Northampton kept pace with 
that average. By contrast, the proportions of 
KIOs in Leeds, Norwich, Warrington, Swansea, 
Newport, Middlesbrough and Wakefield were 
all below the average for the whole period. The 
gap between the top ranking city, Reading, and 
the bottom city, Wakefield, increased from 13.2 
per cent to 20.1 per cent. In 2005 just over half 
the entire workforce in Reading worked in KIOs 
while in Wakefield the figure was less than a 
third.
Another key asset in a city’s capacity to identify 
and assimilate knowledge is the amount of 
R&D and higher education (HE)/research being 
conducted in the region. We have grouped 
these two activities together partly because 
there have been some reclassifications from 
R&D to HE that make R&D data on their own 
inconsistent over time, and partly because 
of the significance of university research in 
generating new knowledge.
Figure 11 suggests some fairly dramatic 
changes in the R&D capacity of our sample 
of cities. In Cambridge, Oxford, Aldershot and 
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Figure 10: Change in knowledge-intensive occupations in selected cities 1981-2005
Reading this declined during the 1980s and 
recovered during the 1990s. At the same time 
capacity in Warrington declined steadily over 
the entire period although it remained just 
above the British average in 2005. Newport 
and Wakefield failed to register any research or 
higher education employees over the 24 years. 
The difference between these two city-regions 
at the bottom of the ranking in 2005 with 
no employees in R&D, and Cambridge at the 
top with 4 per cent employees in R&D, was 
considerable. They represent a major difference 
between the relative capacity of these city-
regional economies to identify and assimilate 
new knowledge. It is also of some concern 
that only Cambridge among the top ranked 
economies has a higher proportion of R&D 
employees in 2005 than it had in 1981. This is 
one indicator of the structural changes taking 
place in the local economies.
One might expect R&D or other knowledge 
assets to affect the output of local high-tech 
manufacturing. But the evidence suggests 
no such correlation. Where there has been a 
decline in the proportion of R&D employees 
this has indeed often been the case. So, cities 
with significant R&D employment in 1981 
that subsequently declined – as in Reading 
and Warrington – saw a relative decline in 
employment in their high-tech manufacturing 
sectors including computers, electronic 
components and scientific instruments. 
(Aldershot saw a decline in computers and 
electronic components). But output also fell 
in Cambridge, the only city to experience 
an overall relative increase in R&D and HE 
employees; yet in Oxford, the resurgence of 
R&D during the 1990s was marked by similar 
growth or resurgence in all of its main high-
tech manufacturing sectors. It is difficult to 
explain from available secondary data these 
differences between the two university cities.
An equally complex relationship exists between 
knowledge workers and output in those cities 
with consistently below average proportions 
of R&D employees. In most cases this 
deficit was reflected in declines in high-tech 
manufacturing: this was generally the case in 
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Figure 11: Change in proportions of employees classified to R&D and higher education in 
selected cities 1981-2005
Norwich, Middlesbrough, Swansea, Leeds and 
Northampton. But both Newport and Wakefield 
bucked this trend with combinations of low 
proportions of R&D employees combined with 
local growth in their high-tech manufacturing 
sectors. Again, with the information to hand, it 
is difficult to explain this apparent paradox. 
Internal knowledge assets are, however, only 
half the story as far as a city’s absorptive 
capacity is concerned. Equally significant is 
their ability to access knowledge through 
networks within the national or international 
economy. Indeed, given that much specialised 
knowledge appears to be located in a handful 
of urban areas around the globe, links to these 
centres are essential in order to appreciate 
where the contemporary frontiers of knowledge 
are in any given specialisation.
In Figure 12 we analyse a snapshot of results 
from CIS4. In this case the analysis shows the 
extent to which the firms in our sample cities 
had been collaborating with universities and 
other knowledge partners elsewhere within 
the UK or abroad. The greatest use of external 
consultants was made by firms in Cambridge, 
Oxford, Reading and Middlesbrough. Firms 
in the same cities also partnered with 
universities located elsewhere as did those 
in Northampton, Wakefield and Aldershot. 
Firms in Swansea, Newport and Leeds had the 
fewest external links with both consultants and 
universities. Norwich firms were also among the 
lowest users of external universities. 
Thus there is some evidence here to support 
the proposition that firms in cities with the 
highest internal absorptive capacity tend to be 
most able to identify and assimilate knowledge 
from external sources. Conversely, around half 
of our cities with the lowest levels of internal 
absorptive capacities are also among those 
with the fewest interactions with external 
knowledge partners. There is some degree 
of overlap between these two categories: 
Middlesbrough has a higher proportion of 
external partners than might be expected and 
Aldershot a lower proportion.
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From this analysis we argue that the collective 
absorptive capacities of our sample of cities are 
both path dependent and cumulative. They are 
path dependent in the sense that the historical 
development of their particular sectoral mix 
has determined their occupational profile. Old 
industrial cities have mostly not developed the 
knowledge-intensive infrastructure needed 
to compete in the contemporary international 
economy. Equally, those cities that did not 
develop such sectors during the 19th century 
have more recently developed new knowledge-
intensive sectors generating knowledge-
intensive occupations and the kinds of skills 
that are needed in competitive post-industrial 
economies. 
These basic differences tend to have a 
cumulative impact. Sectoral and occupational 
differences influence the scale of R&D 
conducted in specific cities. They also provide 
the bases for external interaction. Thus 
Newport, Swansea and Wakefield consistently 
appear in the bottom half of all the tables in 
this section, and have not been gaining on 
the national average. Meanwhile, Oxford and 
Cambridge always appear in the top half with 
Aldershot and Reading not far behind.
This raises the fundamental questions of “why 
are these long-term trajectories so persistent?” 
and “what are the possibilities for changing 
them?” Part of the answer lies in the nature 
and characteristics of the city’s local innovation 
systems and the degree to which they can 
upgrade existing sectoral pathways and create 
new ones. In pursuit of answers we provide a 
brief analysis of some key aspects of the local 
innovation systems of our sample cities.
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Figure 13: Change in annual patent applications to EPO per 100,000 population 1990-2001
2.5 Local innovation systems are the 
dynamic generators of novelty, change 
and growth in their local economies
We define a local innovation system (LIS) 
as “a functionally localised collection of 
organisations, institutions and processes 
that create or adopt valuable new economic 
knowledge and commercialise it”. The 
generation or adoption of novelty by 
combining varieties of indigenous with 
externally sourced knowledge provides a local 
economy with its evolutionary momentum. A 
LIS requires the combination of indigenous 
knowledge capacities – and knowledge 
interaction or collaboration – with the ability 
to identify and interact or collaborate with 
external sources of knowledge to commercialise 
and export new knowledge.
A local innovation system should inject new 
knowledge and ideas into the existing sectors 
of a local economy and provide the basis 
for the emergence of new sub-sectors or 
pathways. Such injections may lead to revived 
or new economic practices by:
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Figure 14: Change in proportions of employees in narrow KIBS in selected cities 1981-2005
Note: Narrow KIBS includes the following SICs:
72: Computing and related activities
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Taking advantage of chance events leading •	
to the opening of locational windows of 
opportunity.
Improving the productivity of existing •	
businesses.
Breaking out of technological lock-in.•	
Creating new institutions.•	
The introduction of new social structures.•	
The available data only allow us to investigate 
a few of these characteristics. One way to 
analyse local new knowledge creation is to look 
at patent data. Although this casts light mainly 
on high-tech manufacturing industries, it does 
provide an indicator of new knowledge creation 
in this area. 
Figure 13 shows the changes taking place 
in the annual rates of patent applications to 
the European Patenting Office (EPO) during 
the 1990s. This analysis mirrors that shown 
in Table 2. All the cities that appeared in the 
top deciles for innovation outcomes in CIS4 in 
Table 2 also produced more patent applications 
than the average for England during the 
1990s. Conversely all those in Table 2 that 
appeared in the lowest deciles produced fewer 
patent applications than the English average. 
While patent applications are an important 
element of an LIS in their own right, there is no 
necessary correlation between the generation 
of new ideas and their application in products 
in the same city. 
The adoption of external new knowledge is also 
an important source of innovation in any city-
regional economy. Every year the UK spends 
some £21 billion on creating new knowledge 
through the science system in universities, 
research institutes and companies. But this 
represents only 3.5 per cent of the total 
creation of such new knowledge among OECD 
countries (AIM 2008). This re-emphasises the 
importance of cities developing capacity to 
identify, access and assimilate external new 
knowledge. In many cases the capacity to 
adopt new knowledge from elsewhere is likely 
to be at least as significant as its indigenous 
creation. 
An important indicator of a city’s capacity 
to commercialise locally or internationally 
generated new ideas is the presence of 
knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS). 
These provide highly specialised contributions 
to firms’ whole range of commercial activities 
including computing, R&D, technical services, 
advertising, market research, legal, accounting 
and tax services.
Figure 14 shows the relative growth in narrowly 
defined KIBS for our sample cities. The 
proportion of employees in KIBS has increased 
most rapidly above the British average in 
Reading, with significant increases in Aldershot, 
Cambridge, Oxford and Warrington. But 
the rates of increase in the remaining cities 
except Leeds have not kept pace with the 
average. The lowest rates are to be found in 
Swansea, Wakefield and in Newport (where the 
proportions of KIBS actually fell between 1981 
and 2005).
KIBS face a problem faced by other aspects 
of a local innovation system. With limited 
numbers of innovative firms, demand for 
specialised services may be too low to provide 
a sufficient market for the development of 
specialised KIBS. But without access to local 
KIBS potentially innovative firms may find it 
difficult to acquire the specialised external 
services that they need to meet their innovative 
potential. 
2.6 New pathways are created by 
interactions between absorptive 
capacity and innovation
We have argued that the ability of city-
regional economies to change or break out of 
historically determined development pathways 
is, to a significant extent, based on local 
capacities to understand, create or adopt and 
commercialise new knowledge. This represents 
a complex combination of absorptive capacities 
and innovation. In this section we turn to the 
question of how interactive combinations of 
these capacities may lead to the creation of 
new pathways. The potential sources of new 
path creation include:
Indigenous creation.•	
Heterogeneity and diversity.•	
Transplantation from elsewhere.•	
Diversification into related industries.•	
Upgrading existing industries.•	
Indigenous creation
We have already argued that this rests on 
the aggregate innovation capacity of a given 
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city-regional economy. Much of this capacity 
is based on the creativity and R&D of existing 
medium and large firms. Nevertheless, a 
significant proportion of new ideas are 
commercialised by new small firms. Figure 15 
examines the rates of new firm formation in our 
sample cities. While average new firm formation 
fell across Britain during the 1990s, it is 
noteworthy that some of our more innovative 
city economies such as Aldershot, Cambridge 
and Oxford saw even lower numbers of new 
firms. This may indicate some loss of dynamism 
in these economies.
Conversely it is also interesting to note the 
slightly above average rates of new firm 
formation in some of our less innovative 
cities such as Wakefield, Newport and 
Middlesbrough. Although the rate is now 
declining, this may indicate that the “gales 
of creative destruction”, to use Schumpeter’s 
famous phrase (Schumpeter 1939), 
experienced by their traditional industries may 
have given local entrepreneurs the incentive 
to start new firms – partly because of a lack of 
alternative employment options.
Heterogeneity and diversity
There has been a long-running debate about 
whether economic growth and the creation 
of new pathways are driven by heterogeneity 
and diversity or by specialisation. The question 
is whether urban economic specialisation 
or diversification is more likely to produce 
the external economies associated with the 
localised spillover of technology and the 
promotion of local innovation. Marshall’s 
(Marshall 1890) original theory of localisation 
economies, developed subsequently by 
Arrow (Arrow 1962) and Romer (Romer 
1990) (known as MAR), focused on the 
benefits of local industrial specialisation, and 
this has been carried into much of the ‘new 
economic geography’ theory, and to Porter’s 
cluster theory. This contrasts with the work 
of Jane Jacobs (Jacobs 1969) who argued 
that the more diverse a city’s economy, the 
more general the external economies of 
agglomeration, the more the scope for varied 
interactions between firms and the more likely 
spontaneous innovation will occur. She also 
held, conversely, that the more economically 
specialised a city is, the more prone it is 
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Figure 15: New firm formation in selected cities 1980-2005
to structural and technological ‘sclerosis’, 
and hence the more vulnerable to shifts in 
competition, trade and technology. 
These propositions can be tested by calculating 
the inverse Herfindahl-Hirschman (H-H) index 
of market concentration. Figure 16 shows these 
calculations for our sample of cities over the 
period from 1981 to 2005. It may be seen that 
the British economy as a whole has become 
less diverse over the period. This is mirrored 
in most of our sample of cities with the 
exceptions of Wakefield and Middlesbrough 
although neither of them was among the most 
diverse economies by 2005. 
The relationship between diversity in the form 
of unrelated variety and new path creation in 
our sample of cities is not strong. Thus, Figure 
17 shows the correlation between the inverse 
H-H index of market concentration – diversity 
– and new firm formation in our sample for 
2005. Although the relationship is positive it is 
not strong: the R2 is only 0.1782. This suggests 
that Jacobs’ type variety and diversity on their 
own may not be major sources of new path 
creation in urban economies. Instead we argue 
that groups of sectors or ‘clustered variety’ 
appear more effective at generating new 
pathways than simple diversity on its own.
We are not able to find relevant secondary 
datasets to analyse possible transplantations 
from elsewhere or the upgrading of existing 
industries in the economies of our sample 
of cities. This needs the kinds of detailed 
historical analysis that we begin to use in the 
next chapter.
 
2.7 Conclusions 
We have argued that, once started, the sectoral 
structures of city-regional economies develop 
along those pathways over long periods of 
time. Cities whose mining, heavy industries 
and manufacturing made them world leaders 
in the 19th century still bear the legacies of 
those activities today. In practice it has proved 
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Figure 16: Inverse Herfindahl-Hirschman index of diversity in selected cities 1981-2005
difficult for them either to keep their original 
industries internationally competitive or to 
create new industries of comparable scale and 
significance. By contrast, those cities that were 
largely by-passed by the Industrial Revolution, 
or started or expanded later in the 20th 
century, have mostly been able to create newer 
pathways in more contemporary industries. 
History matters in both cases. 
A key factor in the long-term economic 
competitiveness of our sample cities has 
been their capacity either to develop new 
knowledge-intensive sectoral pathways, 
something at least partly dependent on their 
past accumulation of knowledge assets. The 
historical and cumulative development of 
particular sectoral pathways – which has been 
affected by those assets – has determined the 
nature and types of occupations found in each 
individual city. 
It has particularly influenced their proportion 
of knowledge-intensive occupations. There 
is a big contrast between our cities both in 
the proportion of such occupations and their 
specific profiles. These differences influence 
their collective absorptive capacity, including 
their relative levels of R&D. In some there is 
very little R&D employment at all; in others it is 
a major sectoral activity.
Some 96.5 per cent of new scientific 
knowledge is produced in other OECD 
economies (AIM 2008). As a result, the relative 
ability of knowledgeable workers in one city 
to communicate, link and network with their 
peers elsewhere is critical to the acquisition 
and assimilation of external leading edge new 
knowledge. The analysis of CIS4 revealed a 
tendency for firms in the cities with the least 
absorptive capacities to be more parochial in 
their searches for collaboration partners. Those 
with stronger knowledge assets were more 
likely to collaborate with external partners. 
Such findings suggest that the collective 
absorptive capacity of city-regional economies 
is both path dependent and cumulative. It 
is path dependent in the sense that their 
industrial history determines the occupations 
located in them. Knowledgeable people are the 
key to economic development in increasingly 
knowledge-based and internationalised 
economic activities. They provide the bases 
for both indigenous economic development 
and the capacity to interact with sources of 
specialised knowledge around the world. It is 
cumulative in the sense that those who start 
with the highest levels of knowledge assets are 
best placed to acquire more of them, especially 
from external sources.
The key role of cities’ local innovation systems 
is to inject novelty into the urban economy 
either by creating indigenous innovation or 
by commercialising innovations originally 
started elsewhere. Patent applications are one 
indicator of the local creation of new scientific 
knowledge. There are major differences 
between our sample cities in applications 
made during the 1990s to the European 
Patenting Office. Firms in the cities with the 
oldest industrial sectors typically made few if 
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any patent applications. Conversely, firms in 
most of the cities with newer industrial sectors 
submitted above-average numbers of patent 
applications.
We also found no necessary correlation 
between the generation of patent applications 
in a particular city and their use in the same 
city. New knowledge is not necessarily used 
in the city where it was created, a conclusion 
derived from differences in growth rates 
between high-tech manufacturing sectors. In 
some cities with the highest rates of patent 
applications, employment rates in such sectors 
accelerated whereas in others they declined.
A key feature of innovation is not simply the 
production of new economically valuable 
knowledge but also its commercialisation and 
sale. An important indicator of the relative 
ability of city economies to commercialise new 
knowledge is their proportion of knowledge-
intensive business services (KIBS). Again we 
found their proportion highest in most of 
the most innovative cities and lowest in most 
of the least innovative. This lack of KIBS in 
most of the low performing cities illustrates 
a conundrum for such cities. They need KIBS 
firms to provide specialised expertise in the 
commercialisation of innovations but they 
cannot create enough market demand for 
their services without commercialising more 
innovations in the first place.
Such problems illustrate the difficulty of 
creating new pathways. For reasons not 
properly explained by the data this may have 
become more difficult during the 1990s, with 
declining rates of new firm formation in most 
of our sample of cities. New firm formation 
was highest in those cities suffering most 
from the “gales of creative destruction” 
experienced in their traditional industries, while 
some more innovative cities appeared to lose 
some dynamism with falling rates of new firm 
formation.
We tested the Jacobs proposition that local 
variety is a source of new path creation. Here 
we discovered a general decline in the sectoral 
variety, as measured by the inverse Herfindahl-
Hirschman index of market concentration. 
Conversely, most became more specialised over 
the 1980s and 1990s. When we correlated the 
index of variety with new firm formation we 
found only a weak positive correlation between 
them. As a result we argue that clustered 
variety or groups of specialisations are the most 
likely to create new pathways.
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Part 3: Cambridge and Swansea: contrasting path 
dependent economies
3.1 A Tale of Two Cities 
In this chapter we turn our focus from a multi-
city statistical discussion to a more detailed 
examination of two particular case-study cities 
selected on the basis of their very different 
experiences – Cambridge and Swansea. The 
former, as our analysis of CIS data showed, 
has been one of the best performing British 
cities for innovative activity; indeed it regularly 
ranks as one of the most innovative places 
in Europe. Swansea, on the other hand, has 
been one of the worst performing cities, with 
a very low rate of innovation. The value of this 
‘contrastive case-study’ methodology is that 
it helps to reveal how locally-specific path 
dependence processes and histories condition 
local innovation outcomes and developments 
– either positively (as in Cambridge) or 
negatively (as in Swansea). As our discussion 
below reveals, the two cities have followed 
very different development paths over the last 
three decades, producing different and self-
reinforcing innovation trajectories.
 
3.2 Path dependent development
The theoretical model outlined in Part 1 posits 
that the main sectoral development pathways 
that emerge over time within a city-region 
economy collectively determine its relative 
capacity (more precisely, of course, the 
capacities of its firms, workers and institutions) 
both to create new knowledge indigenously 
and to absorb new knowledge from external 
sources, and thereby to shape its propensity 
to innovate. History – or place-specific 
history – matters. The past development of 
a local economy and its legacy condition the 
scope and opportunities for new pathways 
of technological and industrial development. 
Cambridge and Swansea illustrate this process 
in significant ways: the two cities have had 
quite different economic histories (see Table 
1), and their quite disparate innovative 
performances over recent decades have 
reflected these differences. 
Swansea: the legacy of an old industrial 
past 
Swansea has seen three main phases in its 
development. Historically, the city was heavily 
dependent on extractive industries and the 
production of coal, iron, copper, tin and zinc, 
earning it the moniker ‘Copperopolis’ in the 
19th century, when at its peak, Swansea was 
producing 60 per cent of the world’s copper 
requirements. However, by the 1960s and 70s, 
many of these heavy industries had closed, 
with the last local coal mine closing in the early 
1980s. 
The second phase of development was 
triggered by the decline of these industries. 
Attracted partly by the pool of low-skilled low-
wage labour released by deindustrialisation, 
multinational companies identified South Wales 
as a location for their assembly branch plants. 
One of the first significant inward investments 
in the electronics industry was the Sony facility 
in Bridgend in 1973, east of Swansea. This 
was the first major Japanese investment in 
Wales, and acted as a catalyst for other inward 
investors, particularly in the electronics sector. 
At the height of production, 50 per cent of 
televisions and 75 per cent of video cassette 
recorders (VCRs) produced in Europe were 
made in Wales. These markets have both now 
effectively disappeared with technological 
change.
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Table 2: Historical evolution of high-tech economies: A Tale of Two Cities
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Swansea 
Decline of local extractive industries.
 
 
 
 
 
Sony electronics factory at Bridgend.
 
WDA established.
 
Last coal mine closed in Swansea County.
UK’s first Enterprise Zone designated in Swansea.
 
 
Loss of competitiveness based on low cost 
labour. 
Planned LG investment does not arrive.
WAG formed. 
Technium Programme launched.
 
 
 
 
Publication of ‘Swansea 2020’, economic 
regeneration strategy for the city.
Cambridge
“Cambridge Consultants” formed, by a group of 
newly graduated scientists and engineers from 
the university.
Mott report published, recommending the 
founding of a Science Park.
Decision by Trinity College to develop the 
country’s first Science Park. 
Outline planning permission granted for 
Cambridge Science Park.
First company, Laser-Scan, moved onto the 
Science Park.
By end of 70s, around 25 companies located on 
the Science Park.
‘Cambridge Phenomenon’ report published by SQW.
St John’s Innovation Centre established.  
University publishes its first IP policy for 
Research Council funded research.
During 1990s, cluster of hi-tech companies in 
the Cambridge area grew to around 1,200 
companies employing around 35,000 people.
Eastern Region Biotechnology Initiative established.
Cambridge Network formed, as a voice for the 
high-technology business community.
Greater Cambridge Partnership formed.
University revises its IP policy for externally 
funded research. Cambridge Angels group formed.
Cambridge Science Park now home to more 
than 70 R&D companies on the 152 acre site, 
including new clusters such as photonics, 
nanotechnology and materials science. 
New IP policy adopted by the university.
 
Around the same time, the public sector 
response to the demise of heavy industry in 
Wales was the establishment of the Welsh 
Development Agency (WDA) in 1976, which 
aimed to encourage business development 
and investment in Wales. A key WDA strategy 
was to encourage multinational companies 
to relocate or open branch plants in Wales, 
particularly in low-cost manufacturing sectors. 
Sony was joined by Panasonic and Hitachi in 
taking advantage of the relatively low wage-
rates and start-up costs that south Wales 
offered, as well as the public sector finance 
available to build new branch plants. One WDA 
aim was to build up the economy through local 
linkages, but one respondent suggests that this 
was not realised:
“The linkages tended not to happen and 
those that did happen tended to be at 
the low value end. I’ve looked at some 
companies, and their local linkages were 
at the packaging end […], not on the 
innovation side.” [Interview SW003]
However from the 1990s, Wales began to lose 
its cost competitive edge as opportunities 
opened up for investment elsewhere, 
particularly in Eastern Europe and Asia. 
Footloose industries, such as branch plants 
that require a labour force with few specific 
high-level skills, began to seek out more 
cost-effective locations elsewhere, leading to a 
decline in low-cost manufacturing in Swansea 
and Wales since the 1990s. As one respondent 
remembers, of the closure of the Lucas plant in 
Swansea: 
“They had a facility in the Swansea Valley 
that made wiring looms for cars, very 
labour intensive, pretty low-tech, but that 
factory literally went to Eastern Europe 
one weekend. They put the whole thing 
on articulated lorries and they moved it to 
another site, because it was a lower cost 
place for them to be.” [Interview SW001]
But cost is not the only factor working 
against South Wales. Technological change 
has also taken its toll on production in Wales. 
For example, with the demise of analogue 
television, Sony closed one of its plants, 
moving production to Barcelona where 
expertise in the new digital and plasma 
technology helped them respond to the 
changing market. 
The experience of LG Electronics in Newport 
in 1996 is cited by some as marking the end 
of the large mobile inward investment plants 
in Wales. The LG development comprised two 
distinct projects: LG Electronics was a complex 
of factories manufacturing cathode ray tubes 
(for colour television sets and computer 
monitors) and associated components; LG 
Semicon was a semiconductor fabrication 
facility. Within months of the investment 
programme being announced, the South 
Korean economy had gone into recession, so 
most of the planned investment never reached 
Wales, illustrating the precarious dependence 
of the local economy on global market 
conditions. 
In response to the loss of jobs in the branch 
plant industries, the third phase in Swansea’s 
development pathway was spearheaded by 
the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG), 
established in 1999. The government 
developed a strategy to move Wales up the 
value chain and focus on developing its 
knowledge economy. This was also partly 
encouraged by a shift in the emphasis of 
European funding towards more capacity-
building and the development of a knowledge-
based economy. Part of the government’s 
strategy included the development of start-up 
incubator and support units, called Technia, 
developed in partnership with the Welsh 
Development Agency (now incorporated 
into the WAG) and Swansea University. 
The first Technium was opened in Swansea 
in 2001, and there are now a total of nine 
throughout Wales. Their aim is to provide 
infrastructure and business support to new 
innovative companies, and to provide space 
for them to develop their ideas and grow into 
successful knowledge-related businesses. 
Located on the old Swansea Docks site (now 
re-branded as “SA1”), Technium 1 provides 
smaller units, while Technium 2 offers larger 
units for companies that have outgrown 
Technium 1’s accommodation. The original 
public-sector led Technium developments 
have also recently acted as a catalyst for the 
private sector to build the next generation of 
Technium buildings. Work is currently underway 
to construct a new building on SA1 with 
additional space for firms that have outgrown 
the Technium 2 building. In Swansea, there 
is also a campus-based “Digital Technium” 
with strong links to the Institute of Advanced 
Telecommunications at the university. However, 
these initiatives are not yet large enough to 
show up in the aggregate data for the city.
Respondents suggest that the Technium 
concept aims to mirror, on a much smaller 
scale, the clustering effect of Silicon Valley. 
But the scale of each Technium development, 
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15: Manufacture food products and beverages
80: Education
64: Post and telecommunications
50: Sale, maintenance/repair motor vehicles
51: Wholesale trade/commission trade, etc.
74: Other business activities
65: Financial intermediation, etc.
22: Publishing, printing, repro recorded media
92: Recreational, cultural and sporting
10: Mining coal/lignite; extraction of peat
91: Activities membership organisations n.e.c.
25: Manufacture rubber and plastic goods
40: Electricity, gas,steam/hot water supply
18: Manufacture apparel; dressing/dyeing fur
34: Manufacture motor vehicles, trailers, etc.
Decline and Resurgence
37: Recycling
29: Manufacture machinery and equipment n.e.c.
90: Sewage/refuse disposal, sanitation, etc.
26: Manufacture other non-metallic products
31: Manufacture electrical machinery/apparatus n.e.c.
75: Public admin/defence; compulsory SS
70: Real estate activities
1991-2005 1981-91
Figure 18: Swansea annual employment change 1981-1991 and 1991-2005
with around 10-12 firms on each of three sites, 
precludes comparison with Silicon Valley. 
“In terms of transformational effect on 
the economy, it’s probably too early to say 
they’ve had a dramatic effect.” [Interview 
SW006]
However, the Technia have been successful at 
their own scale in helping a small number of 
new knowledge-based industries to grow and 
expand. 
Respondents feel that knowledge-based 
businesses are less fickle than branch plant 
industries, and so their growth potentially 
offers a more stable future for Swansea: 
“Because it’s all about people. If you’re a 
technical expert in one of these knowledge-
based companies and you like living in 
Swansea, you don’t want to move to 
Czechoslovakia [sic] to have a lower wage.” 
[Interview SW001]
Swansea City Council has also recently 
produced its own economic regeneration 
strategy, ‘Swansea 2020’, which includes the 
2020 aspiration to become:
“Wales’ leading centre for the knowledge 
economy, recognised for its adoption of 
innovation, and anticipation of market and 
technological change.” [‘Swansea 2020’City 
and County of Swansea (2005, p.31)]
While there are some signs that such a vision 
might be realised, through initiatives such as 
the Technia, respondents feel that there is still 
some way to go to achieve these aspirations for 
the Swansea economy.
What Swansea indicates, then, is the 
difficulty faced by many local economies 
with a legacy of traditional industries which 
seek to reconfigure their employment base 
around new technology and knowledge-
intensive activities. New development paths 
are not easily forged from the legacy of old 
paths. Employment data give some insight 
into this issue (see Figure 18). Sectors can 
be grouped according to the “pathway 
typology” developed in Part 1 (Figures 3 
and 4). Decline is shown not only in the 
traditional heavy industries, such as ‘Mining’, 
but also in their more recent replacements, 
such as the ‘Manufacture of radio, TV and 
communications equipment’. What is perhaps 
more striking is that almost all of what were 
the major employment growth sectors in the 
1980s – in many cases experiencing overall 
growth rates of more than 10 per cent – have 
since lost their dynamism. These activities 
include not just some older manufacturing 
industries (such as ‘Manufactured wood 
products’, ‘Chemical products’ and ‘Medical 
and precision instruments’) but also more 
modern sectors such as ‘Computing and 
related activities’. There is even evidence 
that the fastest-growing sectors in the 1980s 
have also been those to experience the most 
dramatic slowdowns in growth after 1991. 
Thus ‘Manufactured chemicals and chemical 
products’ led employment expansion in the 
city in the 1980s, registering a 38 per cent 
increase, but this turned into a small decline 
between 1991 and 2005. ‘Computing and 
related activities’ have also seen a significant 
slowdown in employment growth, though this 
sector still remained one of the city’s fastest-
growing activities in employment terms in 
this latter period. Employment data indicate 
16 ‘resurgent’ and five ‘ascendant’ pathways. 
Of those five, only two – ‘Other business 
activities’ and ‘Financial intermediation’ – 
can be described as knowledge-intensive 
services. More importantly, R&D activity is 
not significant enough to be recorded. The 
data provide some evidence that, although 
the Swansea economy has been restructuring 
over recent decades, it has not been moving 
into indigenously created knowledge-intensive 
sectors fast enough to compensate for losses 
in its traditional extractive industries and 
electronics.
Cambridge: the creation of a high-tech 
economy
Cambridge has had a very different experience. 
If Swansea’s problem has been escaping 
its industrial past to find a role in the new 
information economy, it is the lack of such a 
traditional industrial past that has proved so 
favourable in forging Cambridge’s success. 
Much has been written about the so-called 
‘Cambridge phenomemon’ – the transformation 
of the city from a relatively small, basically 
service and market town to one of the country’s 
and Europe’s most innovative cities (see, for 
example, Segal Quince Wicksteed, 1985, 2000). 
In many ways, Cambridge illustrates Peter 
Hall’s provocative assertion that “tomorrow’s 
industries are not born in yesterday’s regions”. 
As one commentator puts it:
“You could say that Cambridge’s emergence 
as a high-tech, high-growth and innovative 
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economy was, in a way, because it was a 
sort of ‘greenfield’ location – there was no 
prior heavy industrial past to overcome, but 
instead a first-class university with excellent 
scientists and technologists, and Colleges 
with land that they were willing to develop 
as science parks. It was able to develop a 
new future without hindrance from its past.” 
[Interview C001]
Though a modest, service-based market town 
with little industry (apart from the locally-
based airport and aircraft refitting company 
of Marshalls, a Philips electronics plant, and 
some agro-chemicals activity), Cambridge 
was home to one of the oldest and most 
renowned of the UK’s universities. But it never 
experienced the phase of industrialisation that 
swept through much of Britain in the 19th 
and early-20th centuries. Indeed, the Holford 
Report in 1948 reinforced this lack of industry. 
Fearful of potential pressures to expand 
the city, and the likely effects of such an 
expansion, the Holford Report recommended 
a strategy of ‘containment’. He suggested that 
the population of Cambridge and its adjacent 
villages be limited to 100,000 people in order 
to preserve the special historical character 
of Cambridge as a university town within a 
rural setting. This policy was reinforced by the 
introduction of a strong Green Belt around 
the city. Cambridge’s world-class university, 
with extensive local land ownership and a 
traditionally conservative outlook, tended to 
impose its own anti-industrial hold on the city.
Since the early-1960s, Cambridge has 
developed on a dramatically different economic 
trajectory. According to one recent study: 
A key trigger event took place in 1960, 
when a 24 year old Cambridge chemical 
engineering graduate gathered a group 
of former classmates and acquaintances 
to form Cambridge Consultants to “put 
the brains of Cambridge University at 
the disposal of the problems of British 
industry”. Since then, and under different 
owners, Cambridge Consultants has 
inspired young scientists and engineers to 
be technology pioneers, solving real-world 
problems for clients and spinning out new 
businesses. And legend has it that the 
cluster grew from there. [Library House, 
2004]
In the same decade, a more permissive stance 
towards economic development emerged. In 
particular, the Mott Report in 1969 proposed 
exceptions to the restrictive economic and 
industrial expansion policies of the time, by 
advocating and allowing for the development 
of science-based and university research-based 
industries. 
Following the Mott Report came the stimulus 
of the Cambridge Science Park, created by 
Trinity College in 1970 on some of its land 
on the northern edge of the city. A further 
boost came in 1987 when St John’s College 
developed its Innovation Centre adjacent 
to the Science Park; it was later followed by 
the Peterhouse Science Park. Over the past 
15 years, several other designated sites for 
innovative small firm incubation and growth 
have been established around the edges of 
the city – making some 14 within a radius of 
about eight miles of the city centre (Table 
3). Most are located in just two Cambridge 
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Table 3: The main science parks making up the Cambridge high-tech cluster
The Principal Science/Innovation/Research Parks
Cambridge Science Park 
St Johns Innovation Centre
Techno Park
Peterhouse Technology Park
Babraham Research Campus
Granta Park 
Pampisford Park
Harston Park
Wellcome Trust Genome Campus, Hinxton
Vision Park, Histon
Melbourn Science Park
Cambridge Technology Centre, Melbourn
Great Chesterford Research Park
Cambridge Research Park
Source: Cambridge Enterprise (2004)
postcode districts – CB4 and CB2; and there 
is undoubtedly a ‘Cambridge effect’ – one 
might say a ‘Cambridge brand’ – at work in 
the location of these centres of innovative 
activity, in that a CB postcode enables them 
to identify with, and be externally identified 
as belonging to, the Cambridge ‘high-tech 
cluster’. The Cambridge-based venture capital 
research and advisory consultancy, Library 
House, estimates that the Cambridge high-tech 
cluster now contains around 900 innovative 
firms, employing around 30,000 people. Other 
estimates take a wider definition, including 
education, media and other creative sectors, 
and a wider geographical coverage, suggesting 
as many as 50,000 knowledge-related workers.
The growth of the high-tech economy occurred 
in four waves: the early-1970s to the late-
1970s; the late-1970s to the mid-1980s; the 
mid-1980s to the mid-1990s; and the mid-
1990s to the present (see Figure 19). These 
waves, in turn, have to some extent reflected 
the sectoral evolution of the high-tech base. 
The early phase of development was based 
mainly around IT activity, specifically electronic 
equipment and instruments. The second wave 
not only saw another expansion of these IT 
activities, but also a noticeable development 
of life-sciences firms, mainly in biotechnology. 
The third wave was led particularly by 
IT applications and software. The fourth 
most recent wave saw further expansion of 
this sector, but also very strong growth in 
biotechnology. Some observers now point to a 
possible fifth wave emerging, based around a 
major new phase of growth of medical research 
as part of the enlargement and development 
programme of Addenbrooke’s Hospital, and 
the development of an embryonic ‘clean 
technologies’ cluster (associated with various 
environmental technologies and processes). 
Importantly, over the course of its 35-40 year 
evolution, Cambridge’s high-tech economy has 
become progressively more diversified. Local 
studies and commentators identify up to 15 
main sectoral pathways (Figures 20 and 21). 
While the precise number depends on how 
different high-tech activities are defined – their 
boundaries are often fuzzy and overlapping – 
there is a definite trend towards what might be 
called the ‘clustered diversity’ of the high-tech 
economy.
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32: Manufacture radio, tv/communications equipment
22: Publishing, printing, repro recorded media
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24: Manufacture chemicals and chemical products
41: Collection, purification/distrib. of water
37: Recycling
63: Supporting/auxilliary transport, etc.
65 : Financial intermediation, etc.
64: Post and telecommunications
66: Insurance and pension funding, etc.
35: Manufacture other transport equipment
50: Sale, maintenance/repair motor vehicles
17: Manufacture textiles
60: Land transport; transport via pipelines
27: Manufacture basic metals
72: Computing and related activities
Loss of Dynamism
14: Other mining and quarrying
33: Manufacture medical, precision instruments, etc.
26: Manufacture other non-metallic products
21: Manufacture pulp, paper and paper products
67: Act auxilliary financial intermediation
74: Other business activities
92: Recreational, cultural and sporting
20: Manufacture wood/products/cork, etc.
28: Manufacture fabricated metal products, etc.
30: Manufacture office machinery and computers
70: Real estate activities
25: Manufacture rubber and plastic goods
85: Health and social work
91: Activities membership organisations n.e.c.
55: Hotels and restaurants
71: Renting machinery/equipment, etc.
40: Electricity, gas, steam/hot water supply
18: Manufacture apparel; dressing/dyeing fur
19: Tanning/dressing of leather, etc.
15: Manufacture food products and beverages
Decline
75: Public admin/defence; compulsory SS
73: Research and development
29: Manufacture machinery and equipment n.e.c.
90: Sewage/refuse disposal, sanitation, etc.
Decline and Resurgence
36: Manufacture furniture; Manufacturing n.e.c.
45: Construction
93: Other service activities
34: Manufacture motor vehicles, trailers, etc.
31: Manufacture electrical machinery/apparatus n.e.c.
Ascendant
51: Wholesale trade/commission trade, etc.
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Figure 22: Cambridge annual employment change 1981-1991 and 1991-2005
Note: Excludes all sectors with < 100 employees; Excludes agriculture, etc.; Excludes forestry, etc.
It is also clear that, during this diversification, 
the Cambridge high-tech economy also 
witnessed some relative shifts in fortune 
across its sectors. Even here, ‘Computing 
and related activities’ lost their dynamism 
during the 1990s. Between 1981 and 1991, 
employment grew by some 50 per cent, 
but growth slowed to 11 per cent between 
1991 and 2005 (see Figure 22). By contrast, 
‘Research and Development’ (which covers a 
range of high-tech and knowledge-intensive 
activities) stagnated during the 1980s but has 
been a leading resurgent sector since. As Figure 
24 also shows, most of the city’s (relatively 
small) manufacturing economy has declined 
– or certainly lost its dynamism – since the 
early-1980s. Thus Cambridge, too, shows some 
similarities with Swansea’s development path 
though the fundamental composition of its 
economy is clearly markedly different. 
Some key points emerge from this contrasting 
of the Swansea and Cambridge economies. 
First, the economic history of an area can 
exert an important influence – for good or 
ill – on its subsequent development: ‘history 
matters’. Second, the creation of new local 
economic-technological development pathways 
reflects the interplay of local conditions and 
factors. Third, as Cambridge illustrates, even 
with a favourable mixture of local conditions 
and events, the development of vibrant new 
paths of innovative activity takes time (30-40 
years in Cambridge’s case). This means that 
it is difficult for a city with the legacy of an 
old industrial past to switch quickly into new 
technologically advanced activities. Fourth, 
once critical momentum becomes established, 
new economic trajectories appear to become 
self-reinforcing and path dependent. Fifth, this 
path dependent development can itself spawn 
new technologies and activities as part of an 
evolutionary diversification process. Finally, 
growth does not, however, continue unabated 
without the need for renewal as indicated in 
Figure 4 (Part 1).
3.3 Absorptive capacity: firms need 
sources of new external knowledge
As we have seen in Part 1, the ‘absorptive 
capacity’ of a city-regional economy depends 
on its firms’ ability to identify, assimilate and 
exploit new external knowledge. Data as well 
as information from respondents suggest 
that there is a significant difference between 
Cambridge’s and Swansea’s ability to absorb 
new knowledge into the local innovation 
system. 
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Knowledge identification
According to ‘absorptive capacity’ theory, 
the sectoral and occupational structure in a 
city economy shapes the ability of its firms to 
identify new knowledge. Data from CIS4 (see 
Figure 23) suggest that Cambridge firms utilise 
external information much more extensively 
than their counterparts in Swansea, and indeed 
more than the national average; this implies 
that Swansea firms rely more on internal than 
external information as a factor in innovation. 
Furthermore, Swansea firms seem to make less 
than average use of most information sources 
aside from universities, government and public 
research bodies. 
This difference is compounded by major 
variations in the absolute numbers employed 
in key knowledge-based activities, such as 
R&D and higher education (see Figure 24). 
Cambridge has tripled the number of such 
workers since the early 1980s, in line with 
the growth of the high-tech economy; their 
number is currently estimated by CIS4 at 
around 25,000. As the cluster has grown, so 
has the pool of knowledge workers, which then 
reinforces the innovative performance of the 
economy. The city has thus developed a vital 
critical mass of such workers: 
“There is no doubt that it is the size of the 
technical, scientific and highly educated 
workforce that is a key ingredient of 
Cambridge’s success. Some of these workers 
have been drawn from the university, but 
many also come from elsewhere in the UK, 
even globally, to work in Cambridge. The 
cluster is able to attract the knowledge-
intensive workers it needs, and there is 
a significant movement of these workers 
between firms within Cambridge. In this 
sense there is a constant circulation of 
knowledge within the cluster. And such 
people, by their very nature, are also 
used to searching for and acquiring 
relevant information and knowledge from 
elsewhere.” [Interview CAMB001]
Interviews with Cambridge firms suggest 
that they use multiple sources of relevant 
information and knowledge for innovation. As 
one firm puts it:
“We generate the knowledge needed 
for innovation in several different but 
interacting ways. We have our own 
dedicated research groups of highly 
qualified scientists and engineers. We 
appoint people who are thinkers, who can 
see where technological improvements can 
be made, and are problem solvers. They are 
concerned with developing and extending 
our technologies. They are allowed a 
certain amount of time – say around 10 per 
cent – to ‘think outside the box’. Mainly, 
however, they are working on technological 
developments, improvements and advances 
in response to new market opportunities, 
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the demands of customers and clients, 
and the challenge of competitors… I’d say 
much of our technological development is 
customer- and market-led. Sometimes, we 
‘de-engineer’ our competitors’ products. But 
we are also market leaders, and globally 
orientated, so there is also an impulse to 
improve so we stay on top. We do exchange 
some knowledge and information with 
similar local companies in Cambridge, but 
this is mainly around applications and not 
so much around our core technologies 
– those which are key to the business’s 
success – we don’t share those and the 
knowledge they contain with others!” 
[Interview CAMB002]
Cambridge Consultants, a key player in the 
Cambridge high-tech cluster (see above) also 
illustrates the importance of the knowledge 
base. Its staff do up to 10 per cent of ‘off-
project’ basic research, and are expected 
to keep up with key developments in their 
respective scientific fields. But the vast 
majority of its business is in high-tech product 
development for customers. Innovation 
is market-orientated and demand-led: 
manufacturers and clients engage Cambridge 
Consultants to develop highly innovative 
technology-based solutions and developments 
for products that the manufacturers and 
clients are hoping to commercialise. Cambridge 
Consultants has a number of disciplinary 
teams, including mathematicians, engineers, 
physicists and material scientists, whose 
scientific knowledge is brought to bear on 
the product technology in question: the 
approach is typically multidisciplinary. The 
company specialises in radical not incremental 
innovation, making its knowledge base highly 
sought after:
“Cambridge Consultants is not particularly 
interested in providing an incremental 
innovation service for firms. Most 
manufacturers and other firms are capable 
of doing incremental innovation themselves, 
in-house. We tend to specialise in fee-based 
R&D for innovation of a more radical kind, 
much of which requires a multidisciplinary 
approach which firms can’t readily do 
themselves. For this we employ the best 
scientists we can. This makes us expensive, 
but then that means that firms approach 
and engage us expecting us to produce 
radical solutions. After 40 years Cambridge 
Consultants has built up an impressive 
knowledge base and track record of 
applying that knowledge to produce highly 
innovative products.” [Interview CAMB003]
In Swansea, the picture is markedly different. 
There is relatively little R&D and the city is not 
seen by investors as a ‘natural home’ for R&D 
activity. There are few R&D employees, no 
critical mass as in Cambridge, and hence little 
obvious reason why R&D activities should be 
attracted to the city. The result is less use of 
external sources of information and knowledge 
for innovation. For example, although the Sony 
plant at Bridgend now incorporates an R&D 
facility, this only opened about 25 years after 
Sony had first located in Wales; one respondent 
suggests that Sony has few real roots in the 
local economy. 
However, a key principle behind the Technium 
is the importance of harnessing external new 
ideas within nascent businesses. 
“If you’ve just got indigenous companies 
growing and developing in silos […], then 
my thinking was “you’re just going to get 
more of the same”. You need to bring 
in new ideas, you need to bring in fresh 
thinking, and you can do that indigenously, 
but it’s all a bit incestuous.” [Interview 
SW001]
Within Technia, there are examples of inward 
investor companies working with indigenous 
companies, in some cases successfully 
leading to flotation, but they appear to be 
the exception rather than the norm. Around 
10-15 per cent of Technia tenants are inward 
investors, with the rest being indigenous 
companies, whereas an ideal ratio would be 
50:50. However, the difficulty of attracting 
inward investors is recognised, as knowledge-
based businesses are attracted by local 
expertise (academic or otherwise), rather 
than any financial aid or grant assistance on 
offer. After all, such companies can choose to 
locate near any British or overseas world-class 
university. And, the importance of bringing 
in new ideas for the benefit of indigenous 
companies has apparently not been fully 
recognised by policymakers. 
A further challenge for Swansea is its reliance 
on Swansea University as the main source of 
expertise, both to stimulate local innovative 
firm formation and to attract new inward 
investment firms to the city. But it is felt that 
there is a lack of trust and experience in the 
communication between industry and the 
university. 
“There are these two different worlds 
of knowledge; the industrial world of 
knowledge, and the academic world of 
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knowledge, with traditionally different 
priorities, and whereas those priorities 
might be very much appreciated in 
Cambridge, we haven’t got the experience 
in South Wales of universities sharing their 
knowledge with companies, and companies 
tapping into knowledge at universities.” 
[Interview SW003] 
Despite the much greater flow of knowledge 
from Cambridge University into local high-
tech firms than is the case in Swansea, its 
extent should not be exaggerated. Research 
collaboration between Cambridge firms and 
the university’s science departments and 
laboratories is far from pervasive; not all 
Cambridge high-tech firms use the university’s 
graduates as a source of staff. In Cambridge, 
as in Swansea, university research laboratories 
and local high-tech firms have different 
priorities, and operate over different time 
spans. What matters for firms is being able to 
tap into university research knowledge that has 
commercialisation potential. 
Knowledge assimilation
There are also differences between the 
ability of the two city economies to 
assimilate knowledge. One proxy measure 
is the relative presence of knowledge-
intensive occupations. Cambridge has higher 
proportions of its workforce in all of the 
main occupational categories most readily 
identified with knowledge and technology 
intensive activity – ‘Science and technology 
associate professionals’, Teaching and research 
professionals’ and ‘Science and technology 
professionals’ (Figure 25). Similarly, in terms 
of the proportion of adult graduates (Figure 
26) Swansea is similar to the British average, 
whereas Cambridge scores significantly 
higher. To some extent, of course the higher 
proportions of knowledge-intensive workers 
in Cambridge is itself the result of the city-
region’s high-tech growth over the past 30 
years, but their presence is also crucial in 
maintaining the momentum of that growth: 
The concentration of highly-skilled and 
highly educated workers – especially 
scientific and technical people – in 
Cambridge stands out as one of its 
key strengths. Even before the cluster’s 
development, as a town with a top quality 
university – with a long history of major, 
history-changing scientific achievements – 
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Cambridge had a significant proportion of 
highly qualified people (though the area 
around it didn’t, and still doesn’t). The 
development of the high-tech economy 
has both been attracted by that, and of 
course has in turn itself attracted even 
greater numbers of well educated workers 
to the area: it’s one of those self-reinforcing 
things. There is no doubt that knowledge 
is ‘in the air’ here… It’s a place of intense 
knowledge creation and knowledge 
assimilation, to use your term.” [Interview 
CAMB001]
Respondents agreed on the importance of 
graduate retention for the development of 
the Swansea knowledge economy. However, 
many felt that retention was poor, as there 
are too few local job opportunities, despite 
the attractive location of the city on the coast 
with the Gower peninsula nearby. Another 
commentator from the university questions the 
university’s role in this regard:
“To a certain extent, as a university, we’re 
not really training people up for the local 
area; we’re to give them the skills to go all 
over the world and that would be a sign of 
success.” [Interview SW006]
It is suggested that the Technium programme 
could help retain some Swansea University 
graduates, although the scale of employment 
at this level is too small to affect the overall 
figures. Skills are identified as a significant 
issue in Wales and Swansea, with the lack of 
availability of ‘good people’ a major factor 
limiting the growth of companies, and their 
ability to assimilate knowledge. 
“It’s all very well creating a compelling 
infrastructure for these companies to grow 
and develop. If the people aren’t there, 
then you can’t. You can’t grow without the 
people.” [Interview SW001]
Knowledge exploitation
A local economy’s ability to exploit knowledge 
depends on the number, type and absorptive 
capacity of its firms. A local firm base that 
is orientated to knowledge creation is likely 
to perform well in terms of knowledge 
exploitation as measured by the innovation rate 
and the commercialisation of ideas. Cambridge 
has been developing such a base. The growth 
of its high-tech cluster has been underpinned 
by an above-average high firm formation rate 
(see Figure 19 and Figure 27). In Swansea, 
industrial legacy has left it with a low new firm 
birth rate (Figure 27), especially of knowledge-
oriented firms. 
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Indeed, much of Swansea’s employment 
growth has been in the public sector (currently 
around 38 per cent of employment, compared 
to the UK average of 27 per cent, with the City 
and County of Swansea, the DVLA, the health 
service and university the key employers), and 
there is an under-representation of private 
sector firms in the city. Similarly, a longstanding 
grant-dependent culture through UK regional 
policy assistance and EU funding (Objective 
1 up to 2006 and Convergence Funding until 
2013) is viewed by many to be a barrier to 
private sector exploitation of new ideas. At 
the same time, some regard the nature of 
organisational and management expertise 
amongst Swansea firms as not facilitating 
knowledge exploitation. Firms in Swansea are 
described as “not very sophisticated”:
“They’ve got great technical ideas, but no 
idea if there’s a market for it. They don’t 
have management skills. Unsophisticated, 
I’d say.” [Interview SW001]
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Figure 27: The explosion of patenting activity in the Eastern region
For companies within Technium, a recent 
programme (‘Learning Journey’) took chief 
executives from ten Technium companies to 
Silicon Valley to learn from senior managers 
within hi-tech companies such as Boeing, 
Oracle and Intel, how their businesses were run. 
The programme has been very successful in 
opening up possibilities for new ways of doing 
business and thus exploiting knowledge for 
these firms, but its impact outside participating 
companies has necessarily been limited. 
In Cambridge the culture is quite different. The 
creation and exploitation of knowledge seems 
to be a key driving force across almost all the 
firms in the city’s high-tech cluster. 
“The Cambridge cluster contains numerous 
cutting-edge firms, in the sense that 
they constantly seek to develop new 
technologies and new products. That’s part 
of the atmosphere here. Most firms here 
do not serve the local market, nor just the 
national one, but are global in outlook, and 
know that unless they exploit ideas that 
give them an edge in that global market 
place, their competitors will.” [Interview 
CAMB002] 
Yet Cambridge high-tech firms don’t always 
maximise their potential to exploit and use 
knowledge to grow their businesses into major 
global players. A common complaint amongst 
local commentators is that few Cambridge 
firms grow into large companies, remaining 
instead in the small and medium sized 
categories. This is commonly attributed to a 
lack of managerial skills or the unwillingness of 
scientist-owners (who are good at creating and 
applying new knowledge, but not necessarily 
at management) to pass control over to 
high-calibre managers (who would be good at 
exploiting market opportunities and growing 
businesses):
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Figure 28: The lack of patenting pathways in South Wales
“One of the curious – and often criticised 
– aspects of the Cambridge high-tech 
economy is the general lack of really 
large global firms – the Microsoft sort of 
thing. I don’t think anyone really knows 
why this is a problem, if it is a problem. It 
might mean that Cambridge firms don’t 
actually fully exploit their global potential, 
but I’m not sure it means they innovate 
less than they would if they were huge 
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Note: Narrow definition, excluding SICs 72, 742 & 743 (these are included in narrow KIBS).
companies – probably the reverse. There 
is also the complaint that because they 
remain small, they become prey for global 
companies based overseas. On the other 
hand, a not insignificant number of foreign 
multinationals have been opening research 
facilities and laboratories in Cambridge 
recently, Philips being one of the latest.” 
[CAMB003]
3.4 Local innovation systems: 
the creation, adoption and 
commercialisation of new knowledge
Knowledge creation
Their different development pathways mean 
that the two cities operate quite differently 
as local innovation systems. Patents provide 
one proximate measure of knowledge creation 
and innovative behaviour in a local economy. 
Unfortunately, patent data by class are not 
readily available at the level of individual 
cities, though European Patent Office data 
(for 1977-2002) exist for larger regions, East 
Anglia in the case of Cambridge, and West 
Wales in the case of Swansea. These are shown 
in Figures 27 and 28. And the available data 
suggest that quite different innovation systems 
exist in our two city-regions. 
In East Anglia, levels of patenting have risen 
steadily – dramatically in some activities – 
since the late-1970s, when the high-tech 
cluster began to develop in a concerted 
way. The growth of patenting in ‘electronic 
communication techniques’, ‘medical science’ 
and ‘computing’ has been particularly 
impressive. West Wales shows no comparable 
growth: patenting activity was virtually non-
existent before the early-1980s; even since 
it has remained at a fraction of the rates 
found in East Anglia. Of course, patenting is 
only a rough guide to innovation, and many 
patents never see the commercial light of day. 
But as an indicator of intellectual property 
development, patents do capture certain 
aspects of the knowledge creation process. And 
certainly the enormous differences in patenting 
rates between the two regions suggest that 
whilst a dynamic territorial innovation system 
has emerged and developed in East Anglia – 
and we know that is this mainly localised in and 
around Cambridge – no such system can be 
said to exist in Swansea. 
The so-called ‘creative industries’ increasingly 
interest policymakers. Using the narrow 
definition of these industries (excluding SIC 
categories 72, 742, 743), Cambridge also 
seems to have a lead over Swansea (Figure 29).
The net result of these differences between 
the Cambridge and Swansea economies in 
the potential or actual sources of new ideas 
shows up in CIS4 innovation outcomes (Figure 
30). Cambridge outperforms the British 
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Figure 30: Cambridge and Swansea CIS4 innovation outcomes 2002-2004
average in all forms of innovation outcome 
except ‘advance management techniques’, 
whereas Swansea underperforms in all forms 
of innovation outcomes, suggesting that 
the cumulative characteristics of the local 
innovation system contribute to the path 
dependent nature of development. Once 
a critical mass of innovation is reached it 
appears to become self-reinforcing, as distinct 
identifiable innovation and technological paths 
emerge, as in Cambridge. Not only is there a 
lack of critical mass in Swansea, which hinders 
such a self-reinforcing process, the nature of 
the existing innovation is also generally less 
radical. Respondents confirm that there is 
limited R&D within Swansea, which inhibits 
knowledge creation and innovation outcomes. 
One of the few Swansea companies cited 
as successful in innovation is Corus, which 
sponsors research in the University Engineering 
School. But while others mention the potential 
for innovation in the ICT sector in the city, the 
feeling is that most innovation is not leading 
edge: 
“Whether you say it’s product innovation or 
whether it’s just that they’re using software, 
and developing web pages, and these 
types of things...it’s mid-level innovation.” 
[Interview SW003]
Another respondent from the Council 
comments on the difficulty moving from the 
ideas stage to patenting: 
“With the patents idea, to make it 
commercially viable, is a hell of a leap of 
faith. In fact, we and the university have 
discussed that on numerous occasions, 
because we’ve done joint initiatives where 
we’ve encouraged people to come forward 
with their ideas, but where we always 
failed, is getting that commercialisation of 
those ideas. Making them venture capital 
ready, and that’s the huge thing.” [Interview 
SW005] 
Having ready access to venture capital – and 
being viewed as a highly innovative place by 
venture capital organisations – has certainly 
been a major factor behind Cambridge’s 
success. As the Cambridge high-tech cluster 
has developed, a local venture capital industry 
has emerged to serve it – a form of co-
evolution – with some significant players, 
including Amadeus and Cambridge Gateway 
Fund. According to Library House some 
108 companies in the Cambridge cluster 
are venture-backed, totalling £600m of 
institutional capital, making it second only to 
London, and fourth in Europe (Library House, 
2007). Thirty-six per cent of venture-backed 
cluster companies are in the ‘healthcare and life 
sciences’ sector. There is also a thriving local 
business angel community. The general view is 
that access to venture capital is a strength of 
the cluster:
“Not only is there now a healthy 
locally-based VC market, Cambridge’s 
position close to London means that VC 
organisations there are within easy reach, 
and view Cambridge favourably. I don’t 
think venture capital is a problem, though 
some argue that the British venture capital 
industry could steer more money into 
high-tech activity. The key issue is having 
entrepreneurs who can convince investors, 
to have ideas that can be brought to 
market. Cambridge does well here, but can 
do better.” [Interview CAMB004]
Knowledge acquisition and adoption
External knowledge networks are key to 
external knowledge identification and 
absorption. We have seen that an estimated 
96.5 per cent of OECD new research knowledge 
is created outside the UK (AIM, 2008). This 
makes international knowledge networks 
particularly significant in bringing in new ideas 
and knowledge to particular localities. 
CIS4 data show that Cambridge firms are 
generally much more integrated into various 
networks (government partners, universities, 
consultants, customers and suppliers) than 
Swansea firms (Figure 31). Particularly striking 
is the extent to which Cambridge far outstrips 
Swansea on almost every type of network, 
indicating that its firms have much more 
extensive and intensive relationships with other 
firms and bodies – and potential access to 
much richer sets of external knowledge. 
“It may be that some Cambridge high-tech 
firms have relationships with other local 
firms, and might collaborate in some way 
with them. But my impression is that for 
most, like us, the customer base is national 
and even more importantly international, 
so links outside Cambridge are the key 
ones. Our fastest growing market is the 
Far East and China, so that is where we 
look for relationships with customers and 
manufacturers. Global relationships matter 
much more than local ones. To survive 
you have to think globally.” [Interview 
CAMB002]
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“We monitor what is going on in all of our 
potential markets. Much of our business 
comes from the US. So we have recently set 
up an office in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
The people there will be better placed 
to know what US customers want, to 
collaborate with them, and push that 
aspect of our growth strategy. Setting up 
that office there will allow us to better gain 
knowledge from that market, and about our 
competitors there.” [Interview CAMB003]
In Swansea the importance of overseas 
networks is recognised by respondents as 
being critical for knowledge identification and 
absorption. Through the Technium programme, 
a number of international networks have been 
set up, for example, linking with science parks 
in China, South Korea and the US. However, 
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beyond these formal networks, individual 
firms are said to be constrained in developing 
their own networks by time constraints normal 
in start-up companies. The Welsh Assembly 
Government funds a number of programmes 
to encourage collaboration, although not 
everyone agrees that they help knowledge 
adoption. One company cites a government-
supported programme that funds international 
visits in collaboration with British embassies, 
of which that particular company had made 
full use to help set up foreign markets and 
distributors. However, another respondent 
gives the example of government funding 
which encourages firms to collaborate within 
Wales with other companies and universities, 
but does not fund collaboration outside Wales. 
External knowledge networks beyond Wales 
are therefore not being actively encouraged 
through this type of funding mechanism, 
which is likely to be hampering new knowledge 
adoption. 
Knowledge commercialisation
A key aspect of innovation is the 
commercialisation of new knowledge: what 
matters is turning patents into commercial 
products and services. Knowledge-intensive 
business services (KIBS) can provide 
important external expertise for this. Here 
again Cambridge leads Swansea. Cambridge 
outperforms the British average in half of 
the KIBS sectors and is particularly strong in 
R&D and ‘computing and related services’, 
whereas Swansea underperforms in all detailed 
sectors, and is particularly weak in R&D and 
advertising. 
Interestingly, despite its image as a place of 
‘blue-sky’ scientific research, the importance of 
commercialisation of ideas is stressed by most 
Cambridge firms. 
“At the end of the day, it’s bringing ideas to 
the market that counts. Companies don’t 
make money just doing ‘blue-sky’ research. 
It’s having ideas that can be turned into 
profitable products that matters. That’s why 
we work closely with customer firms and 
manufacturers. They know we can develop 
and apply advanced and cutting edge 
technology to make a product idea into a 
marketable product. That’s where, for us 
anyway, the technological challenge comes 
from. That’s what our people are trained to 
do.” [Interview CAMB003]
In such firms, managerial and marketing 
expertise is vital, since the general view is 
that scientists are not always very good at 
commercialising their ideas.
Although the data does not suggest that 
Swansea is strong in KIBS, respondents say that 
local legal and accounting services are of a high 
standard. For example, a large firm of lawyers 
located near the Technium buildings specialises 
in technology expertise, which can serve its 
companies. Successful commercialisation 
also depends on identifying markets for new 
products and services. There are examples 
of companies in Swansea that have a global 
outlook on markets, and have commercialised 
their products accordingly:
“We could not have started this company 
if we couldn’t have aspired for it to be a 
global company right from the beginning, 
because the critical mass in the UK alone 
was never going to be enough to support 
the several millions that were spent in 
development.” [Interview SW002]
New path creation
As we saw in Part 1, technological-
industrial evolution can be of two main 
kinds: path dependent evolution along a 
given technological-industrial trajectory; 
and the creation of new paths and new 
trajectories. New path creation is most readily 
identified with the introduction of radical 
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new technologies, products or processes, 
such as gene mapping and manipulation. 
How such radical new paths emerge is a 
vastly under-researched issue. It may follow 
major breakthroughs in research and ideas 
from universities, competition and external 
knowledge sources. There is much debate 
about whether their emergence is accidental 
or deliberate (such as a planned break from 
existing technological paths). A further issue 
is why radical innovations occur in some 
places and not others? Our comparisons 
between Cambridge and Swansea highlight the 
importance of local history, local conditions 
and a local critical mass (an ‘ecology’) of 
innovative firms in influencing the pace and 
direction of innovation. 
Some innovation occurs within existing firms. 
Other innovation occurs as a result of new 
firms being formed (such as spinouts from 
an existing firm, or from a university by a 
researcher or team of researchers). Cambridge 
appears to be a much more dynamic economy 
in terms of new enterprise formation than 
Swansea. In Cambridge, new firm formation has 
been consistently above the British average, 
whereas in Swansea since the mid 1980s it has 
been consistently below and the gap in firm 
density between the two cities has steadily 
grown (Figure 33).
In Cambridge, we know from Figure 19 that 
there have been successive waves of new 
firm formation, each associated with a new 
technological pathway in the local economy. 
Spinouts from existing companies have been 
an important factor in this growth. Cambridge 
Consultants alone can claim to have spun 
out more than 40 new firms. It sees this as 
a critical role within the Cambridge cluster, 
and perhaps one of its distinctive features. 
Many spinouts have tended to specialise in a 
particular technology, and have contributed to 
the development of both existing technologies 
and new technological paths. A few have been 
companies like Cambridge Consultants – fee-
based research and technology providers for 
other firms and manufacturers. University 
spinouts, investments and start-ups only 
began in the late 1980s, and did not gather 
momentum until as recently as 2000. What 
both Figure 19 and Figure 27 on patents 
suggest is that successive new paths have 
been created in Cambridge, adding to the 
technological variety across the cluster. 
Whilst these paths may appear distinct, some 
commentators view them much more as 
comprising what in Part 1 we called ‘related 
variety’, sectors linked to a greater or lesser 
extent by common types of knowledge and 
cognitive frameworks:
“Of course the different technological/
industrial sectors in the Cambridge cluster 
do different things – quite different things. 
But most involve advanced computing 
in one form or another, so there may be 
more commonality than you’d think. It’s 
as if they all draw on – and thereby add 
to – Cambridge’s fundamental expertise 
in advanced and applied computing 
techniques. I wouldn’t want to push this 
too far, but there’s something in it. After 
all, it was in computing that the Cambridge 
cluster really started – and the Cambridge 
Computing Laboratory played no small 
part in this – and advanced computing and 
software development plays a key part 
in many of today’s firms in the cluster.” 
[Interview CAMB001]
Whereas in Cambridge, there was no legacy of 
old industrial paths, in Swansea the problem 
has been the limited scale of new path 
creation, compared to the losses experienced 
with the decline of the old paths. A lot of hope 
seems pinned on the role that the university 
could play in helping to initiate new pathways 
of innovative development. 
“You can spin-off from there – that’s the 
engine.” [Interview SW004]
It was also recognised that the Technia could be 
an important catalyst for start-ups in Swansea, 
but the scale of new firm formation to date has 
been too limited either to replace firm closures 
or to show up in the data. No specific clusters 
of new firms in identified sectors particularly 
stand out in Swansea:
“To be honest, it’s kind of all over the place. 
You could probably say ICT and software 
are the biggest ones. […] It really is quite 
diverse.” [Interview SW003]
One ICT company cited is Vishay Siliconix, 
which recently opened an R&D facility at the 
Digital Technium at the university in 2004. 
With headquarters in Silicon Valley, they chose 
Swansea as the location for their new design 
centre due to its proximity to the expertise 
and specialist graduates at the university. The 
company will generate intellectual property 
in the city. Another new pathway, still in its 
infancy, is Life Sciences, with the Institute of 
Life Sciences opened at the university in June 
2007. In partnership with IBM, which provided 
a supercomputer for the Institute (Blue C), they 
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undertake ground-breaking medical research, 
focusing on building commercial-academic 
links. However, these appear to be isolated 
examples of new path creation and firm 
formation, and as one respondent comments:
“There are examples like that, but I think 
in terms of ‘significance’ they are probably 
fewer and far between than we would 
like, if we’re honest, and we could do with 
another dozen of those. And then I think 
we’d be starting to motor a bit.” [Interview 
SW005]
The limited new firm formation in Swansea 
is explained by some respondents as a result 
of the historical dominance of traditional 
industries in Wales, where an entrepreneurial 
culture has not been present. The ‘job for 
life’ system which operated for generations 
in Wales, primarily through the coal and 
steel industries, has meant that the spirit of 
entrepreneurship has not been fostered in local 
communities, thus leading to below average 
rates of new firm formation. 
“You come back to path dependency, we’ve 
locked into the thinking “South Wales, we 
aren’t innovative. Innovation takes place 
elsewhere, it doesn’t take place in Wales”, 
so I think there’s that Welsh mentality of 
also downplaying our achievements. The 
university’s quite good at that. We do very 
good things, but we’re in Swansea, so we’re 
not in London, in Cambridge, we’re outlying 
in the UK.” [Interview SW003]
It is also felt in Swansea that new spinout 
firms from the university are being hampered 
by the burden of academic expectations and 
institutional bureaucracy. 
“I think the problem is, I don’t know if it’s 
just my perception, but universities are 
particularly bad at that, certainly on the 
spinout side. I forget how many companies 
Swansea University spins out, but it isn’t 
a great deal, when you consider the 
initiatives that they had within that. And I 
think one of the things they’re always told 
to do is create further links with the SME 
community in the area, and it’s the one 
thing that they never do because there’s no 
money in it.” [Interview SW005] 
Another respondent, a venture capitalist and 
CEO of a high-tech start-up, comments on the 
difficulties he experienced when dealing with 
universities:
“There’s an awful lot of innovation in 
the university, but nothing gets out. And 
there was no commercial bridge, there 
was nothing filling that gap to the market 
place on innovation […] and I found that 
is was very difficult to spin companies out 
of universities. […] The process of spinning 
out was painful, and it was a turn off for 
investors, an absolute turn-off, and in the 
end, the stuff that we’ve done since then 
has been our own stuff. If someone’s trying 
to spin out of a university right now, I’m 
thinking “Do I really want to get involved?” 
Because this is going to be a nightmare.” 
[Interview SW002]
There are at least two examples of spin-ins 
to the university, where companies set up 
independently have approached the university, 
to see if they would like to collaborate. 
However, it is not clear how common this 
phenomenon is. 
3.5 Concluding remarks
These two contrasting case studies were 
chosen to illustrate in more detail the ideas 
expounded in Part 1 and the cross-city findings 
discussed in Part 2. Cambridge is one of the 
UK’s and Europe’s most innovative high-
tech economies, with its origins in the early 
1960s. Cambridge’s subsequent growth gained 
critical momentum in the 1970s, establishing 
a process of self-reinforcing path dependency. 
The initial contingent conditions – a lack of 
an old industrial past and attendant legacy 
together with the availability of ‘green-field’ 
sites, a world-class university and the presence 
of forward-looking enterprising individuals 
– all combined to drive the emergence and 
development of a new high-tech economy. 
Swansea experienced the opposite trajectory. A 
city encumbered with declining old industries, 
a less famous university and a general lack 
of an individualist entrepreneurial culture, 
has struggled to reconfigure its past into 
an innovative high-tech future. Efforts are 
being made in this direction, but the ‘initial 
conditions’ have been much less propitious 
than in Cambridge. 
What Cambridge also illustrates is the way that 
technological trajectories, once established, 
exhibit tendencies towards path dependence: 
that is, they also inherit the legacy of their 
own past. As each technological specialisation 
has emerged and become positively ‘locked 
in’, it has formed a pathway for cumulative 
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innovation. The Cambridge cluster was 
narrowly focused, in sectoral terms, in the 
early years. But successive new technological 
paths have been created, some drawing on 
pre-existing paths, and others entirely new. 
The whole process has fostered – and been 
fuelled by – the co-evolution of a highly 
entrepreneurial environment, an increasingly 
positive involvement by the university and a 
raft of institutions and supporting knowledge-
intensive services (such as venture capital 
organisations) which also make up the 
Cambridge cluster. In short, a host of external 
economies of localisation have helped provide 
the cluster with continued momentum. 
Swansea illustrates only too clearly how 
difficult it is to escape the past, to shed the 
legacy of an old locked-in economy. But even 
here, one wonders why it is proving so difficult 
to forge a new pathway of development? 
Evidence from other old industrial cities in 
Europe and the USA suggests that escape 
is possible. In Part 1 we identified a number 
of ways such places can reconfigure their 
economies. In some cases it has proved 
possible to draw on the skills, specialisms 
and technologies inherited from the past and 
upgrade and reorient them towards new, more 
technologically advanced but related industries 
and specialisms. In other cases, foreign firms 
have brought in new technology and new 
industry that has become the centre of gravity 
of a new phase of innovative development. It is 
widely recognised that there needs to be a step 
change in Swansea – and Wales more generally 
– and that one potentially successful way of 
doing that is to bring in new thinking and new 
companies. As one respondent puts it:
“These companies come into Technium, 
and they’re two men and a dog, and if they 
grow to five men and a dog, that’s good, 
but it would be great if I could find one in 
there that grows to 500 men and a dog, 
because I think it’s those step changes that 
we need.” [Interview SW001]
The challenge for this sort of strategy, of 
course, is to find the right sort of companies 
that will embed themselves locally and that will 
act as a magnet and a catalyst for innovation, 
entrepreneurship and new firm formation. 
Cambridge succeeds in attracting the research 
labs of multinational companies precisely 
because it already has a thriving high-tech 
economy. Starting the process from scratch 
is another matter. Swansea’s earlier attempt 
to attract foreign companies, in the form of 
electronics assembly plants, illustrates how 
precarious or disappointing foreign investment 
can be. The city’s failure to develop an LCD 
and plasma-based television sector to replace 
its role as a production platform for the old 
CRT television shows how difficult it can be 
even to upgrade an existing path of industrial 
activity. Instead, Swansea has become the 
location for an expanding public sector, which 
whilst providing jobs, is not always a basis 
for innovative economic growth. Indeed, the 
dominance of the public sector in Swansea 
is seen by respondents as a hindrance to the 
growth of innovation and the private sector:
“We exist largely on the public sector, the 
indulgence of the public sector. And to 
break out of it, I come back again, we need 
something transformational.” [Interview 
SW004] 
Having highlighted the success of Cambridge, 
however, it is also important to note that in the 
last three years, concern has emerged over the 
future growth of its high-tech cluster (Library 
House, 2007). There are several signs that its 
growth momentum has slowed: patent activity 
has eased noticeably, the number of new 
firms has dropped back, and there has been a 
slowdown in venture-backed investment. 
“The … analysis suggests a rather 
bleak picture for the Cambridge cluster. 
Overall the cluster is losing ground to 
its competitors, particularly London. At 
a sectoral level, the cluster is strong in 
stagnating areas such as life sciences 
but weak in emerging areas like Web, 
Mediatech and Clean Energy.” (Library 
House, 2007, p. 23)
There is, then, a debate as to whether 
Cambridge is missing the boat on Web-based 
and Media-based innovative activity (so-
called soft innovative sectors) – and whether 
this matters. As the Library House Report 
acknowledges, London already had a head start 
in these activities, so it would be unrealistic for 
Cambridge also to be developing a leading role 
in this part of the ‘new economy’: 
“…the failure of Cambridge to harness 
the growth of the Web and new media 
industries is likely the result of the 
fundamental natures of these new sectors 
than a specific defect in the development 
of the Cambridge cluster. London, simply 
because of its vast size, is far more likely 
to be a leader in soft innovation.” (Library 
House, 2007, p.24)
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Others point to the high house prices 
(themselves a product of Cambridge’s growth 
success), the problems with land availability 
and costs, planning barriers, and pronounced 
road congestion problems – as negative 
externalities that may be holding Cambridge 
back. 
There is certainly some validity to these 
concerns, but the slowdown is by no means 
taking place across the board, and may have 
other causes:
“It could be that some firms are facing 
constraints and that they are losing 
momentum. But I don’t think this is true 
for all high-tech firms in Cambridge. We 
are growing at about 15-20 per cent per 
annum, are about to extend our laboratory 
space, and have recently expanded in 
the USA. I know of other firms that are 
also showing strong growth. It is true that 
housing, transport and other infrastructural 
problems have got much worse, and local 
government and the planning process are a 
major headache, and these do need urgent 
action. But I would say that part of the 
problem – the slowdown that you refer to 
– could be as much the lack of managerial 
expertise in Cambridge and the fact the 
cluster still depends on just a few – the 
same few – movers and shakers. It’s unfair 
to expect these same people to repeatedly 
maintain high levels of entrepreneurship 
and enterprise all the time. Perhaps the 
key challenge for the cluster is to find more 
people like them to widen the gene-pool 
of serial entrepreneurial talent.” [Interview 
CAMB003]
And it may be that Cambridge has not missed 
the clean-tech or clean energy wave of 
innovation. Though the number of such firms 
in Cambridge is small, it is nevertheless one of 
the UK’s most identifiable clean-tech clusters. 
This illustrates one of the classic aspects of 
path creation and path dependence. In the very 
early stages of a new technology or industry, a 
number of alternative locations may be equally 
well placed to develop it – the ‘window of 
locational opportunity’ (to use the jargon) is 
open. But as that sector develops, it is likely 
to concentrate in some locations, according 
to the specific technological requirements of 
the sector and the different specialisms and 
capabilities of different locations. It remains to 
be seen whether the hard technologies of the 
Cambridge cluster can be harnessed towards 
clean-tech applications. 
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Part 4: Why do cities differ in innovative performance? 
Conclusions and some lessons for policy
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we draw together our findings 
and interpret them in the light of our initial 
theoretical approach. We link those findings 
to the concept of path dependence and the 
contributions of absorptive capacity and local 
innovation systems to the creation of new 
pathways in city-regional economies and the 
determination of the trajectories that they 
follow subsequently. In doing this we note 
the methodological difficulties involved in 
analysing some elements of the conceptual 
framework using the available time series 
datasets that only span a period of around 25 
years, when some urban industrial legacies go 
back over many decades. 
4.2 Knowledge, absorptive capacity and 
local innovation systems
We have argued that knowledge assets and 
the creation of new knowledge are critical 
driving forces underlying both the creation of 
new pathways and the subsequent parameters 
determining the trajectories that they follow. 
In particular, the historical development of 
the aggregate capacities of urban economies 
to identify, assimilate and exploit knowledge 
(their absorptive capacity) determines the 
range of possibilities for their immediate future 
development. Those possibilities that they 
explore are controlled by their systemic abilities 
to make use of these assets to generate or 
adopt new knowledge and to translate it into 
commercial products and services (their local 
innovation systems).
Our evidence on technological lock-in as 
a source of path dependence is that it can 
sometimes lead to decline or to reluctance 
to adopt new pathways. In Swansea, for 
example, there have been two major waves of 
growth and decline as a result of technological 
lock-in. The local economy was once based 
on the extractive industries mining coal, iron, 
copper, tin and zinc. At its peak, Swansea 
was producing 60 per cent of the world’s 
copper requirements. But a combination of 
declining natural resources and a failure to 
break out of and diversify its longstanding 
mining technologies led to the closure of most 
of these industries by the 1960s and 1970s. 
This lesson had not been learned when the 
second wave of growth developed on the 
basis of foreign investment in electronics. The 
technologies used in the production of cathode 
ray tubes (CRTs) and video cassette recorders 
(VCRs) were quickly rendered obsolete by the 
new technologies of plasma and liquid crystal 
display (LCD) screens and digital recording 
devices such as DVD recorders. In both cases, 
the local economy remained locked-in to 
technologies that were overtaken either by 
the discovery and exploitation of alternative 
sources of natural resources or by the invention 
of replacement technologies. By the time the 
scale of these “gales of creative destruction” 
was recognised locally it was too late to do 
much about it.
Some respondents have suggested that even 
Cambridge may be subject to an element of 
technological lock-in. So, despite successive 
waves of development spanning related 
developments in IT, life-sciences, software, 
and biotechnology it can be argued that 
many of these new pathways are linked by 
similar cognitive frameworks in advanced 
computing. Despite this, there are emerging 
areas concerned with media applications of 
advanced computing, currently clustered in 
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London that the Cambridge economy has not 
yet developed.
With respect to institutions, we have argued 
that institutional inertia is one possible source 
of path dependence. By this we mean that if 
the pace of institutional change lags behind 
that of economic or other forms of change, 
this is likely to slow them down or arrest their 
modernisation. They are then more likely to 
maintain existing trajectories of development. 
Many of our private sector respondents in 
both Cambridge and Swansea criticise the slow 
pace of change in local institutions. Common 
complaints are that the universities are too 
slow in starting or reacting to new economic 
opportunities, public policy in a number of 
areas is well behind what is needed to exploit 
new markets, and that old working practices, 
such as the expectation of a job for life in the 
same company, are unrealistic in the face of 
contemporary international competition.
There are complex and cumulative relationships 
between the sectoral development pathways 
followed in individual cities, the resulting 
occupational and knowledge assets generated 
by their particular sectoral structures, their 
consequential abilities to generate new 
knowledge, and the development of new 
pathways. Thus, in cities like Swansea, the 
decline of its traditional extractive sectors 
left it with pools of unemployed labour with 
limited retraining potential. Yet a combination 
of foreign investment in electronics mass 
production branch plants and growing public 
sector employment provided new sources of 
work. 
The historical development of this particular 
set of knowledge assets limits both the 
range of possibilities that may be explored 
for the future and the capabilities of the 
local innovation system. First, as with other 
cities like Middlesbrough and Wakefield, the 
development of knowledge-intensive sectors 
has been slower than elsewhere. Second, 
this has a knock-on effect on the quality 
of human capital with lower proportions 
of both knowledge-intensive occupations 
and those specifically engaged in R&D or 
university research in most of the subsequently 
least innovative city economies. Third, the 
combination of a few large private sector 
employers with a large public sector does 
not foster a culture of enterprise. Fourth, the 
local innovation system is then characterised 
by low patenting rates in all of the least 
innovative cities in our sample. Fifth, this is 
also accompanied by a lack of local investment 
and venture capital markets. Finally, the 
commercialisation of new ideas is also limited 
by the low proportions of knowledge-
intensive business services in most of the 
least innovative city economies in our sample, 
namely Norwich, Middlesbrough, Swansea, 
Wakefield and Newport. 
The cumulative nature of the relationships 
between the historical development of 
particular sectoral structures, limited absorptive 
capacity and weak local innovation systems 
illustrates the conundrum confronting cities 
wishing to break out of relative decline. 
Without the creation of new sectors or the 
upgrading of old ones it has proved difficult 
to generate the kinds of knowledge assets or 
local innovation systems necessary to compete 
in international knowledge-intensive markets. 
But, without the presence of adequate 
absorptive capacity and a dynamic innovation 
system, it is difficult either to create new 
pathways or to upgrade old ones. Thus, the 
problem of creating critical momentum in such 
economies is constrained both by the limited 
possibilities created by their previous historical 
development pathways and by the extent to 
which the parameters set by their previous 
histories control the range of practical decisions 
that can be taken today.
In contrast with all of the least innovative 
cities in our sample, most of the more 
innovative urban economies had very little 
industrial history even by as late as the 1960s. 
The Industrial Revolution had not touched 
Aldershot, Cambridge, Oxford and Reading. 
Subsequent industrial developments in the 
latter had been mainly limited to motor 
cars, biscuits and seeds. Northampton and 
Warrington were medium sized towns before 
their designation in 1968 for expansion as 
‘Partnership New Towns’. In this sense the 
possibilities for the future were relatively 
unconstrained by sectoral development 
histories of the past. They also created new 
pathways in a number of different ways.
Oxford and Cambridge started from centuries 
of accumulated knowledge in their universities. 
But the new town expansions of Northampton 
and Warrington had limited histories of new 
knowledge creation. Despite this, all four have 
ended up in the top decile of innovative cities 
in the 2002-2004 CIS4. One phenomenon that 
at least three of them share is that institutional 
changes enabled them to take advantage of 
the knowledge-based economy. Thus the Mott 
Report, in 1969, influenced the institutional 
climate at Cambridge University in favour 
63
of the subsequent construction of some 14 
science parks and innovation centres. In Oxford 
the local governance institutions took a further 
20 years to come round to support for the 
first science park there. The designation of 
Northampton and Warrington as ‘Partnership 
New Towns’ created an institutional framework 
one of whose main purposes was to enable 
modern economic development. 
In all cases, these developments have taken 
some time to come to fruition. In Cambridge 
it took nearly 40 years from the formation 
of Cambridge Consultants in 1960 for its 
embryonic private sector knowledge activities 
to develop into a mainstay of the local 
economy. From the perspective of its local 
innovation system it has been the bringing 
to market of new ideas rather than blue-sky 
research at the university that has been the 
driving force of this change. Much the same 
can be said of Northampton and Warrington 
which took some 30 years since their 
designation in 1969 to create and develop their 
innovative private sector-based pathways.
In contrast with the less innovative cities 
in our sample, those that reached the top 
decile in CIS4 have generally benefited from 
the cumulative development of their critical 
momentum in terms of local absorptive 
capacity and innovation systems. On the 
basis of their sectoral development pathways, 
Aldershot, Cambridge, Oxford and Reading 
all developed consistently higher levels of 
knowledge-related employment than other 
cities. This was then reflected in higher rates 
of the generation of new knowledge in the 
form of patent applications and their ability to 
commercialise these new ideas as a result of 
there being more knowledge-intensive business 
services (KIBS) in those cities. In these cases a 
virtuous circle of development was established.
In Cambridge, the momentum of its private 
sector economy has been generated on the 
basis of five factors: the co-evolution of an 
entrepreneurial environment; the presence 
of venture capital; the positive attitude of 
the university; a raft of institutional changes; 
and a growing market demand for KIBS. 
These form a complex and interdependent 
innovation ecology. This is not a closed system. 
Cambridge along with Oxford, Warrington and 
Reading were also the most open economies 
in our sample. CIS4 data show that they had 
extensive external knowledge networks across 
the UK and international economies. Given 
that some 96.5 per cent of all new scientific 
research and knowledge in the OECD countries 
is created outside the UK (AIM 2008) such 
openness is a critical source of new ideas for 
any local economy. Not only does it provide 
access to new specialised knowledge but also 
market intelligence and information on what 
competitors are doing.
The combination of internal knowledge assets 
and innovation with national and international 
scanning for new knowledge and market 
opportunities marks a major difference between 
economies like Swansea and Cambridge. The 
development of an electronics industry in 
Swansea was hamstrung by its branch plant 
status and a lack of local knowledge about 
the technological developments taking place 
elsewhere in the international economy. These 
combined to limit the industry to a one product 
life-span.
In contrast, global relationships matter more in 
the private sector in Cambridge than local ones. 
Their ability to make local decisions, based on 
knowledge of best practice and world markets, 
has enabled the Cambridge economy to 
generate successive waves of knowledge-based 
developments after each preceding wave loses 
its original dynamism. Thus in the 35 years 
since 1973 when the first Sony electronics 
factory was opened at Bridgend, four new 
successive pathways of high-tech development 
have been started in Cambridge. While the 
electronics industry in Swansea has now run 
its course, there is now some momentum 
building behind a fifth Cambridge wave of 
development, in clean technologies.
4.3 Positive and negative path 
dependence: the cases of Cambridge 
and Swansea
Our case studies of Cambridge and Swansea 
suggest that we can distinguish between 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ path dependence 
in the evolution of urban economies. In 
Cambridge, the experience of the past 40 
years has been one of a virtuous process of 
emergence and self-reinforcing growth of 
a successful innovative high-tech economy 
in which both industrial and technological 
development have continued to expand, whilst 
their success has stimulated the creation of 
yet further new paths. These have led to 
the progressive accumulation of a skill base, 
enterprise culture and institutional framework 
all conducive to continued innovative activity 
(see Figure 34).
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Swansea’s urban economy has struggled to 
shed the legacies of its industrial past. The 
inheritance of the skills, business cultures 
and institutional structures of that past has 
not proved conducive to, and has restricted 
the scope for, the creation, emergence and 
development of new pathways of industrial and 
technological growth. The TV industry failed 
to generate the critical mass and innovative 
momentum to become a new pathway of 
development. And more recent attempts to 
develop new innovative enterprises have thus 
far failed to take off. The upshot is that the 
absorptive capacity of the local economy is 
limited, and this in turn hinders the growth 
of its embryonic innovative paths and the 
emergence of other new ones. Compared to 
Cambridge, then, Swansea can be said to have 
been characterised over the past 40 years by 
‘negative’ path dependence (see Figure 35).
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Figure 34: Stylised process of positive path dependent innovative development – the case 
of Cambridge
Figure 35: Stylised process of negative path dependent innovative development – the case 
of Swansea
These two studies illustrate how quite different 
evolutionary paths can arise between urban 
economies. In large part, these paths reflect 
how local conditions and constraints inherited 
from earlier economic development can 
shape the scope and opportunities for future 
development – not in any deterministic way, 
but as a result of locally specific contingent 
conditions. To be sure, there are certain generic 
economic processes and mechanisms that come 
into play once activated by favourable local 
circumstances and conditions, but it is the 
locally contingent nature of the latter that is 
of critical importance, and this is where path 
dependence takes on a locally dependent 
nature (Martin and Sunley, 2006). This makes 
the issue of policy somewhat problematic.
4.4 Policy lessons
The broad policy lessons that we take from 
this analysis are that it is necessary to think 
large-scale and long-term as opposed to 
small-scale and short-term. Those were the 
only kinds of policy that we found that had a 
measurable impact either on individual firms 
or the aggregate figures for city economies. 
Furthermore, it is essential to build serious 
policy analysis into proposals from the start 
in order to ascertain what outcomes they 
generate on the ground. 
In looking for possible policy lessons we adopt 
an explicitly evolutionary economic approach. 
This leads us to look for examples of public 
policy contributions to such phenomena as:
Path breaking non-equilibrium long-term •	
change.
Internal (endogenous) sources of economic •	
growth.
Market opportunities.•	
The co-evolution of non-economic factors •	
with economic change.
The emergence and adaptation of innovation •	
ecologies through time. 
Our first insight was that, particularly 
in leading areas like Cambridge, there is 
widespread scepticism among private sector 
firms about the relevance or efficacy of public 
policy on innovation. When asked to name 
any policy that had made a positive and 
measurable difference to their innovation 
activities few could do so. Their development 
was largely based on the identification of 
market opportunities and organising to 
meet those demands. In lagging cities like 
Swansea, although few firms could identify 
any national or local public policies that 
had made a significant difference to their 
innovation performance, they all recognised 
the significance of the large-scale European 
Union cohesion funds. Few of the firms we 
interviewed in Swansea would have existed at 
all without the EU structural funds obtained as 
a result of the area’s Objective 1 and transition 
fund status. Some will undoubtedly cease 
to exist when the transition funds run out in 
2013.
Second, in contrast with the minimal impact 
of public policies targeted specifically at local 
innovation, several firms noted significant 
effects arising from other kinds of policy. 
There was, for example, some criticism of 
local land use planning as being too slow, 
bureaucratic and unimaginative in the planning 
of transport and communications infrastructure 
and in restrictions placed on the physical 
development of the new knowledge-based 
economy. On the other hand, the large-scale 
town expansion schemes at both Northampton 
and Warrington proved to be very successful 
at generating innovations and creating new 
industrial pathways. Thus, while the plans were 
developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
they have taken several decades for their 
current characteristics to evolve and emerge 
(Source: Universities’ own records).
Third, it is also important to note that the 
promotion of innovation in itself has not been 
one of the objectives of these town expansion 
schemes. Much of what they have achieved, 
however, has been based on the creation of 
an innovative set of institutional and cultural 
phenomena that positively encourage new 
economic growth and along with this, almost 
unintentionally, innovation. These findings 
point to the need for public policy to establish 
or encourage the co-evolution of institutional, 
cultural and economic change in local 
development trajectories. What is needed is 
a planning system dedicated to change and 
expansion, an entrepreneurial culture and a 
search for market opportunities. This needs to 
be combined with a well-educated workforce.
Fourth, the town expansion schemes in our 
sample cities also illustrate the need for 
large-scale policies combined with broad 
enabling objectives and the acceptance of 
considerable system redundancy, or the 
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opportunity to duplicate and experiment. 
Thus the town expansion plans were based 
on a broad set of objectives, none specifically 
targeted on innovation. The universities of 
Cambridge and Oxford are also large-scale 
institutions with multiple objectives out of 
which innovations sometimes emerge. In 
2004 the approximate number of researchers 
needed to generate one spinout company from 
Cambridge University was 756 while in Oxford 
it was as high as 2,202. These figures indicate 
that it is important to tolerate considerable 
system redundancy within multiple objectives 
institutions like universities if wider outcomes 
such as innovation is to emerge. 
Fifth, we also found the systemic and 
interrelated nature of local innovation systems 
was important in determining their relative 
abilities to generate and commercialise new 
knowledge. The combination of historic 
knowledge assets and research into new ideas 
could generate local markets for specialised 
services such as venture capital and KIBS. 
Where these developed simultaneously 
they could impart critical momentum to 
a city’s development trajectory. We only 
have examples of this kind of momentum 
developing as a direct result of market demand, 
as in Cambridge. But, public policy should 
be used more effectively than it is now to 
create demand for innovation through public 
procurement in big spending activities like 
defence and health. They should be used 
to generate new market demand in lagging 
economies, though this would require a high 
degree of sophistication in the construction of 
polices designed to create market opportunities 
rather than to deal with ‘market failures’.
Sixth, we also found that social ties with strong 
local social networks could be a barrier to 
starting and developing new ideas. In Swansea, 
for example, the strong local social networks 
embedded in generations of working in large 
industries with expectations of jobs for life 
effectively limited the search for new ideas 
from outside Wales. In contrast, some of the 
firms we interviewed in Cambridge claim that 
their global networks are more important to 
them than any local ones. In general it appears 
that the more open city systems that are 
connected with world-wide knowledge sources 
and collaborators usually possess greater 
innovative momentum than those that are 
more locally embedded. As a result, policies 
such as Welsh Assembly Government support 
for international visits and links with British 
embassies to enter new markets and establish 
distributors appeared to be more effective than 
its efforts to encourage local Welsh business 
networks.
The need for international knowledge networks 
is paramount. Innovation is increasingly based 
on internationally distributed systems. The 
key city-regions are also increasingly marked 
by the development of systemic innovation 
involving sectors located in other key cities. In 
geographical terms this world of innovation is 
both spiky – with a number of key hubs – and 
connected. The most significant hubs include:
USA – Silicon Valley, Seattle, Austin, Raleigh, •	
Boston.
Europe – Stockholm, Munich, Helsinki, and •	
also Israel.
India – Bangalore.•	
Far East – Beijing, Singapore, Seoul, •	
Shanghai, Taiwan, Tokyo.
British cities that aspire to join them must 
be internationally connected and develop 
specialised niches.
Seventh, in all the most innovative cities in 
our sample the historical development of 
their current successes took between 30 and 
40 years. Public policies that played a role 
in their early years had not foreseen what 
emerged several decades later. Many of the 
complex outcomes of the interplay between 
early policy decisions and market forces arose 
not so much as a result of some guiding 
intelligence but more as an unpredictable 
emergence of the interplay of the activities 
of different interest groups. In this sense it 
appears that it would not have been possible 
some 40 years ago to have devised a suite 
of public policies that would have ensured 
today’s outcomes. Public policies for innovation 
should therefore be broadly enabling, tolerant 
of system redundancy and sufficiently large-
scale and long-term to adapt to change. They 
should enable continual radical and systemic 
innovations to evolve and emerge in ways that 
cannot be foreseen today. 
Finally, we argue that path dependence raises 
some difficult policy issues. For one, it suggests 
that the range of positive feedbacks (such as 
those from external networks) that promote 
path dependence offer policymakers ‘windows’ 
for policy intervention. Such interventions 
may involve the manipulation of private 
sector technology decisions by various means 
including taxes and subsidies, information 
67
or technology transfer programmes, and 
deliberate university and government 
sponsored innovation schemes. But such 
windows of opportunity may be narrow, and 
are likely to be both locality-specific and long-
term. Yet, the very same path dependence 
processes suggest that policy should endeavour 
to keep such ‘windows’ open to avoid lock-in 
to a restricted technological path. 
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Appendix 1: Maps
Map 3: Northampton Master Plan 1969
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Map 4: Warrington Master Plan 1972
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Map 5: Travel-to-Work Areas with core populations > 125,000 in 2001
Source: Travel-to-Work Areas 1998. National Statistics.
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Map 6: Analysis of innovation outcomes of novel products in GB cities CIS4, 2002-2004
Source: Travel-to-Work Areas 1998. National Statistics.
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Map 7: Analysis of innovation outcomes of new products in GB cities CIS4, 2002-2004
Source: Travel-to-Work Areas 1998. National Statistics.
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Map 8: Analysis of innovation outcomes of novel processes in GB cities CIS4, 2002-2004
Source: Travel-to-Work Areas 1998. National Statistics.
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Map 9: Analysis of innovation outcomes of new processes in GB cities CIS4, 2002-2004
Source: Travel-to-Work Areas 1998. National Statistics.
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Map 10: Analysis of innovation outcomes of new corporate strategy in GB cities CIS4, 
2002-2004
Source: Travel-to-Work Areas 1998. National Statistics.
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Map 11: Analysis of innovation outcomes of advanced management techniques in GB 
cities CIS4, 2002-2004
Source: Travel-to-Work Areas 1998. National Statistics.
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Map 12: Analysis of innovation outcomes of changes to organisation structure in GB cities 
CIS4, 2002-2004
Source: Travel-to-Work Areas 1998. National Statistics.
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Map 13: Analysis of innovation outcomes of changes to marketing strategy in GB cities 
CIS4, 2002-2004
Source: Travel-to-Work Areas 1998. National Statistics.
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Appendix 2: Secondary data indicators
This Appendix provides further information 
on the range of secondary data indicators 
used in the study, including details of data 
sources, definitions and data limitations. The 
secondary data indicators have been used to 
provide evidence on absorptive capacity and 
innovation systems in each of the 12 case 
study city-regions. In addition, time series data 
has been used to explore the evidence for path 
dependent development and new path creation 
in these cities over the last 25 years (since the 
early 1980s). The indicators used in the study 
are listed in Table 1 below. 
For each indicator, this Appendix provides the 
following details:
Description of the indicator.•	
Time series – the years for which data has •	
been obtained. For most indicators, this is 
the economic trough years of 1981, 1991 
and 2005. However, for some indicators a full 
time series of annual data has been obtained 
from 1980/1981 to 2005/2006.
Data source – details of the data source or •	
data provider.
Geographic basis – a brief description of •	
how data has been matched to city-region 
boundaries. For most indicators, data for 
local authority districts has been best-fit to 
1998 TTWA boundaries. 
Definitions – details of sectoral and •	
other definitions used, special analytical 
techniques, etc. 
Comments – a description of any important •	
data limitations, e.g. due to discontinuities in 
time series data; poor geographic fit to city-
regions; missing data, etc.
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Table 4: List of secondary data indicators
Topic / Theme 
Path dependent development
Development pathways
Structural change
Differential effects
Other
 
 
 
 
New path creation
New path creation & new pathways 
Local innovation systems
Knowledge creation 
 
 
 
Knowledge adoption 
Knowledge commercialisation 
 
Absorptive capacity
Knowledge identification 
Knowledge assimilation 
Knowledge exploitation
 Indicators / Secondary data
Location quotients
Sectoral employment change
Shift share analysis
Population 
Employment change 
GVA per capita 
Employment in tradable sectors 
Visible exports per capita
Firm births per capita 
Firm density per capita
University 5* research departments  
Patent applications per capita 
Employment diversity index 
Employment diversity within sectors 
Employment in creative industries
Innovation outcomes 
Geography of knowledge networks
Firm deaths per capita 
Age of businesses 
Employment in KIBS sectors
Information sources for innovation 
Employment in R&D
Occupational breakdown of workforce 
Adult qualifications (degree level)
None
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Table 5: Location quotients – 2-Digit (1992 SIC)
Indicators of path dependent development
Table 6: Location quotients – 3-Digit (1992 SIC)
Table 7: Sectoral employment change
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
Geographic basis 
Definitions 
 
Comments
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
Geographic basis 
Definitions 
 
Comments
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
Geographic basis 
Definitions 
 
Comments
Location quotients for 2-digit sectors (1992 SIC).
1981, 1991, 2005 (economic trough years).
ONS: 1981 Census of Employment; 1991 Annual Employment Survey; 2005 Annual Business 
Inquiry.
Data for local authority districts is best fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries (pre-1996 districts are 
used for 1981 data).
Location quotient is the sector’s share of city-region employment, expressed as a ratio of the 
sector’s share of national (Great Britain) employment. A location quotient above 1.0 indicates 
a sector specialisation in the city-region, relative to the national average.
None.
Location quotients for 3-digit sectors (1992 SIC).
1981, 1991, 2005 (economic trough years).
ONS: 1981 Census of Employment; 1991 Annual Employment Survey; 2005 Annual Business 
Inquiry.
Data for local authority districts is best fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries (pre-1996 districts are 
used for 1981 data).
See definition above for 2-digit sectors.
Location quotients for 1981 are missing for some 3-digit sectors; this is because it is not 
possible to obtain an exact match between the sectors used in the 1980 SIC and 1992 SIC.
Employment change in 2-digit and 3-digit sectors (1992 SIC).
1981, 1991, 2005 (economic trough years).
ONS, 1981 Census of Employment; 1991 Annual Employment Survey; 2005 Annual Business 
Inquiry.
Data for local authority districts is best fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries (pre-1996 districts are 
used for 1981 data).
None.
Data for 1981 is missing for some 3-digit sectors; this is because it is not possible to obtain 
an exact match between the sectors used in the 1980 SIC and 1992 SIC.
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Table 8: Shift share analysis
Table 9: Population
Table 10: Employment change
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
Geographic basis
Definitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comments
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
 
Geographic basis
Definitions 
 
Comments
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
 
 
Geographic basis
 
Definitions 
 
Comments
Shift share analysis, based on employment change in 2-digit sectors (1992 SIC).
1974, 1981, 1991, 2005 (economic trough years).
ONS: 1974 & 1981 Census of Employment; 1991 Annual Employment Survey; 2005 Annual 
Business Inquiry.
Data for 1991 & 2005 is for 1998 TTWAs; data for 1974 & 1981 is for 1984 TTWAs.
Shift share analysis is a technique used to identify the relative contributions of industry 
structure or mix versus other non-structural factors to overall employment change in a city-
region. 
The analysis identifies two principal measures:
1) Structural shift – this measures the structural influence on employment change, and 
reflects the mix of industries in the city-region.
2) Differential shift (also referred to as the regional or competitive shift) – this measures the 
contribution to overall employment change due to each industry in the city-region growing at 
a faster or slower rate than its national growth rate. It removes structural effects, and allows 
examination of a residual element which includes non-structural influences such as policy. 
The differential shift provides a measure of the effect of the city-region’s competitiveness on 
employment change. 
There are some temporal and geographic discontinuities in the underlying employment data 
series, due to changes in industrial classifications and TTWA definitions. This means that it is 
not possible to carry out shift share analysis over the full 1974-2005 period; results for the 
shorter 1991-2005 period are not affected by these problems. 
Resident population in city-region.
1981 to 2006 (annual).
ONS, mid-year population estimates.
Data for local authority districts is best fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries.
None.
None.
Number of employees in employment.
1981, 1991 & 2005 (economic trough years).
ONS: 1981 Census of Employment; 1991 Annual Employment Survey; 2005 Annual Business 
Inquiry.
Data for local authority districts is best-fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries (pre-1996 districts are 
used for 1981 data).
None.
Persons working on a self-employed basis are excluded from the figures.
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Table 11: GVA per capita
Table 12: Employment in tradable sectors
Table 13: Visible exports per capita
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
 
Geographic basis
Definitions 
 
 
Comments
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
 
 
Geographic basis
 
Definitions 
 
 
 
Comments
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
 
Geographic basis
 
Definitions 
 
Comments
Gross value added (GVA) per capita at constant (2000) prices.
1980 to 2005 (annual).
Cambridge Econometrics, GVA estimates; plus ONS, mid-year population estimates.
Data for NUTS3 areas is best-fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries.
Figures are estimates of workplace-based GVA, in which the income of commuters is allocated 
to their place of work.
None.
Percentage of city-region’s employees in tradable sectors (as defined below).
1981, 1991, 2005 (economic trough years).
ONS: 1981 Census of Employment; 1991 Annual Employment Survey; 2005 Annual Business 
Inquiry.
Data for local authority districts is best-fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries (pre-1996 districts are 
used for 1981 data).
Tradable sectors are defined as the following 1992 SIC sections: A, B & C (agriculture, 
forestry/fishing, mining & quarrying), D (manufacturing), J & K (financial, real estate & other 
business services).
None.
 
Value of visible exports per capita (current prices).
1996 to 2002 (annual).
HMRC, discontinued sub-regional trade data series; plus ONS, mid-year population estimates.
Varies, but mainly NUTS3 areas (although some NUTS2 areas), which are best-fit to 1998 
TTWA boundaries.
None.
Trade data for West Yorkshire is available only at NUTS2 level; separate figures for Leeds & 
Wakefield city-regions cannot therefore be derived.
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Table 14: Firm births per capita
Indicators of new path creation
Indicators of new path creation
Table 15: Firm density per capita
Table 16: University 5* Research Departments
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
Geographic basis 
Definitions 
 
Comments
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
Geographic basis 
Definitions 
 
Comments
Indicator
Time series
Data source
Geographic basis
Definitions 
 
Comments
Annual VAT registrations per 10,000 resident adults.
1980 to 2005 (annual).
Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (previously DTI), VAT registration 
statistics; plus ONS, mid-year population estimates.
Data for local authority districts is best-fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries (pre-1996 districts are 
used for 1980-1993 data).
None.
Trends in the numbers of VAT-registered enterprises are affected by changes in the VAT 
registration threshold. The threshold was increased by a significant (much higher than 
inflation) amount in 1991 and 1993.
VAT-registered enterprises per 10,000 resident adults.
1980 to 2006 (annual).
Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (previously DTI), VAT registration 
statistics; plus ONS, mid-year population estimates.
Data for local authority districts is best-fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries (pre-1996 districts are 
used for 1980-1993 data).
None.
Trends in the numbers of VAT-registered enterprises are affected by changes in the VAT 
registration threshold. The threshold was increased by a significant (much higher than 
inflation) amount in 1991 and 1993.
Number of 5* and 5-rated university departments.
1992, 1996 & 2001 (RAE years).
HEFCE, Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) results by institution and unit of assessment.
Universities are allocated to 1998 TTWAs according to the location of their main campus.
The highest grade in the 1996 & 2001 RAE was 5*; the highest grade in the 1992 RAE was 5.
Numbers are also expressed per 100,000 adult residents.
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Table 17: Patent applications per capita
Table 18: Employment diversity index
Table 19: Employment diversity within sectors
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
 
Geographic basis
Definitions 
 
Comments
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
 
 
Geographic basis
 
Definitions 
 
 
 
 
 
Comments
Indicator
 
Time series
Data source 
 
Geographic basis
 
Definitions 
 
 
 
 
Comments
Annual EPO patent applications per million resident population.
1977 to 2002 (annual); although data for some city-regions is missing for some of the earlier years.
Eurostat, Regio database; plus ONS, mid-year population estimates.
Data for NUTS2 areas is best-fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries.
Applications are broken down by IPC section and class.
NUTS2 areas do not provide a good geographic fit to 1998 TTWA (city-region) boundaries. In 
some cases, the NUTS2 area includes more than one city-region, and separate figures cannot 
therefore be obtained for these cities (e.g. Cambridge & Norwich; Leeds & Wakefield).
Herfindahl-Hirschman diversity index for the city-region’s employment base.
1981, 1991, 2005 (economic trough years).
ONS, 1981 Census of Employment; 1991 Annual Employment Survey; 2005 Annual Business 
Inquiry.
Data for local authority districts is best fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries (pre-1996 districts are 
used for 1981 data).
Herfindahl-Hirschman diversity index is calculated as the sum of the squared percentage 
employment shares of all 3-digit sectors of the 1992 SIC (except for 1981 which is based on 
the 1980 SIC at 3-digit level). 
Higher index values indicate a less sectorally diverse employment structure. 
The index can be standardised by multiplying the H-H index value by the number of sectors 
and dividing by 100; an equal distribution of employment across all sectors would then 
produce a standardised index value of 100.
The 1981 index is not directly comparable with that for 1991 and 2005, due to the use of a 
different version of the SIC.
Herfindahl-Hirschman diversity index, showing employment diversity at 3-digit level within 
2-digit sectors (1992 SIC).
2005 only.
ONS, 2005 Annual Business Inquiry.
Data for local authority districts is best-fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries (pre-1996 districts are 
used for 1981 data).
See definition of Hirfindahl-Hirschman index above. 
Higher index values indicate less employment diversity within the 2-digit sector.
To allow comparisons between 2-digit sectors, all index values are standarised by multiplying 
the H-H index value by the number of 3-digit sub-sectors and then dividing by 100. With an 
equal distribution of employment across all 3-digit sub-sectors, the standardised index value 
will be 100, regardless of the number of sub-sectors.
None.
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Table 20: Employment in creative industries
Table 21: Innovation outcomes 
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
 
 
Geographic basis
 
Definitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comments
Indicator
 
 
Time series
Data source 
 
Geographic basis
 
Definitions
 
 
 
Comments
Percentage of city-region’s employees in creative industry sectors.
1981, 1991, 2005 (economic trough years).
ONS: 1981 Census of Employment; 1991 Annual Employment Survey; 2005 Annual Business 
Inquiry.
Data for local authority districts is best-fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries (pre-1996 districts are 
used for 1981 data).
The definition of creative industry sectors is based on that used by the Department for 
Culture, Media & Sport, although some variations are necessary in order to obtain comparable 
time series data back to 1981. 
For 1991 and 2005, the definition is based on the 1992 SIC and includes the following 
activity codes: 22 (publishing & printing), 72 (computer & related activities), 74.2 
(architecture, engineering & related technical consultancy), 74.3 (technical testing & 
analysis), 74.4 (advertising), 74.81 (photographic activities), 92.1 (motion picture & video 
activities), 92.2 (radio & TV activities), 92.31 (artistic & literary creation), 92.32 (operation of 
arts facilities), 92.4 (news agency activities). 
For 1981, the definition is based on the 1980 SIC, and includes the following activity 
codes: 34.52 (gramophone records/pre-recorded tapes), 47.5 (printing/publishing), 49.3 
(photographic processing), 83.7 (professional/technical services), 83.8 (advertising), 83.94 
(computer services), 97.11 (film production, distribution/exhibition), 97.41 (radio/TV 
services, theatres, etc.), 97.6 (authors, composers/own account artists).
There is a degree of overlap between the creative industries and KIBS sector definitions (see 
below); 1992 SIC codes 72, 74.2, 74.3 and 74.4 are included in both definitions. 
Percentage of firms introducing new or novel products; new or novel processes; and wider 
forms of innovation (i.e. new corporate strategy; advanced management techniques; changes 
to organisational structure; and changes to marketing strategy). 
CIS4 survey covers innovation activities in 2002-2004.
DTI, UK Innovation Survey 2002-04 (CIS4) dataset.
The CIS4 dataset uses the firm’s postcode sector as a geographic reference; this is used to 
allocate firms to 1998 TTWAs. 
‘New’ products/processes are defined as products/processes new to the firm, but not 
necessarily new to the market or industry (significantly improved products/processes are also 
included in the definition). ‘Novel’ products/processes are defined as products/processes 
new to the firm’s market or industry, i.e. introduced by the firm before its competitors.
None.
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Table 22: Geography of knowledge networks
Table 23: Firm deaths per capita
Table 24: Age of businesses
Indicator
 
Time series
Data source 
 
 
Geographic basis
 
Definitions 
 
Comments
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
 
 
Geographic basis
 
Definitions 
 
Comments
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
 
Geographic basis
Definitions 
 
 
Comments
Location of co-operation partners used by firms in their innovation activities (local/regional; 
UK national; other Europe; other countries).
CIS4 survey covers innovation activities in 2002-04.
DTI, UK Innovation Survey 2002-04 (CIS4) dataset; responses to questions 17 & 18 in CIS4 
survey. 
The CIS4 dataset uses the firm’s postcode sector as a geographic reference; this is used to 
allocate firms to 1998 TTWAs. 
Local/regional partners are defined as those within approximately 100 miles of the enterprise.
None.
Annual VAT de-registrations per 10,000 resident adults.
1980 to 2005 (annual).
Department for Enterprise, Business & Regulatory Reform (previously DTI), VAT statistics; 
plus ONS, mid-year population estimates.
Data for local authority districts is best fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries (pre-1996 districts are 
used for 1980-1993 data).
None.
Trends in the numbers of VAT-registered enterprises are affected by changes in the VAT 
registration threshold. The threshold was increased by a significant (much higher than 
inflation) amount in 1991 and 1993.
Age of VAT-registered enterprises.
None; data is for March 2006.
ONS, Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR).
Data for local authority districts is best-fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries.
The IDBR gives each enterprise a ‘birth date’ which is taken as the earliest registration for 
either VAT or PAYE. 
None.
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Table 25: Employment in KIBS sectors
Table 26: Information sources for innovation
Table 27: Employment in R&D
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
 
 
Geographic basis
 
Definitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comments
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
 
Geographic basis
 
Definitions 
 
Comments
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
 
Geographic basis
 
Definitions 
 
Comments
Percentage of city-region’s employees in KIBS sectors.
1981, 1991, 2005 (economic trough years).
ONS: 1981 Census of Employment; 1991 Annual Employment Survey; 2005 Annual Business 
Inquiry.
Data for local authority districts is best-fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries (pre-1996 districts are 
used for 1981 data).
KIBS sectors are narrowly defined, using the definition adopted in Simmie & Strambach 
(2006). 
For 1991 and 2005, the definition is based on the 1992 SIC and includes the following 
activity codes: 72 (computer & related activities), 73 (R&D), 74.1 (legal services, accounting/
auditing, market research, business & management consultancy, management of holdings), 
74.2 (architecture, engineering & related technical consultancy), 74.3 (technical testing & 
analysis) and 74.4 (advertising). 
For 1981, the definition is based on the 1980 SIC, and includes the following activity codes: 
83.5 (legal services), 83.6 (accouting/auditing), 83.7 (professional/technical services), 83.8 
(advertising), 83.94 (computer services), 83.95 (other business services), 83.96 (central 
offices) and 94 (R&D).
The figures for 1981 are not directly comparable with those for 1991 and 2005. This is 
because it is not possible to obtain an exact match between the sectors used in the 1980 SIC 
and 1992 SIC. The 1981 definition is slightly wider than that used for 1991 and 2005.
Importance of different sources of information used by firms in their innovation activities.
CIS4 survey covers innovation activities in 2002-2004.
DTI, UK Innovation Survey 2002-04 (CIS4) dataset; responses to Question 16 in CIS4 survey.
The CIS4 dataset uses the firm’s postcode sector as a geographic reference; this is used to 
allocate firms to 1998 TTWAs.
None.
None.
Percentage of city-region’s employees in R&D sector.
1981, 1991, 2005 (economic trough years).
ONS: 1981 Census of Employment; 1991 Annual Employment Survey; 2005 Annual Business Inquiry.
Data for local authority districts is best-fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries (pre-1996 districts are 
used for 1981 data).
R&D is 1992 SIC category 73 (for 1991 & 2005 data); and 1980 SIC category 94 (for 1981 data.
Reliability of AES/ABI data on R&D employment for certain cities appears to be affected by 
re-classification of employment, particularly between the R&D and higher education sectors; 
this is a particular problem with the R&D employment data for the Oxford city-region.
Indicators of absorptive capacity
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Table 28: Occupational breakdown of workforce
Table 29: Adult qualifications (degree level)
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
 
Geographic basis
 
Definitions 
 
 
Comments
Indicator
Time series
Data source 
 
Geographic basis
 
Definitions 
 
 
Comments
Occupational breakdown of residents in employment.
1981, 1991, 2001.
ONS: 1981, 1991 & 2001 Census.
Data for local authority districts is best-fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries (pre-1996 districts are 
used for 1981 data).
Data for 1991 & 2001 is based on the Standard Occupation Classification (SOC 2000); data 
for 1981 is based on socio-economic groups.
Figures for 1981 are not fully comparable with those for 1991 & 2001, due to the use 
of a different occupation classification. However, it is possible to compare higher order 
occupations (i.e. managerial, professional and associate professional/technical occupations) 
on a consistent basis across all three years.
Proportion of adult residents with degree level or equivalent qualifications (NVQ Level 4 or 5).
1981, 1991, 2001.
ONS: 1981, 1991 & 2001 Census.
Data for local authority districts is best-fit to 1998 TTWA boundaries (pre-1996 districts are 
used for 1981 data).
Population base for 1981 and 1991 is all persons aged 18 and over; population base for 2001 
is persons aged 16-74 years.
None.
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